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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the literature that seeks to understand institutions. In 
particular the aim of this thesis is to shed light on how certain institutions arise 
in society as a result of collective choice, how in turn they shape behaviour 
of agents, and finally what their welfare properties are. These questions 
are tackled using the methodology of microeconomic theory where agent 
preferences, the state of technology, and the informational environment are 
taken as exogenous. In particular it is argued that the existence of different 
constraints on the informational environment can give rise to a rich theory of 
institutions that can explain why inefficient and seemingly inefficient institutions 
arise in a second best world. The first chapter o f this thesis is concerned 
with the incidence of costly dispute resolution in society. The question o f 
why agents fail to revolve disputes costlessly is tackled. This contributes 
to the positive theory of individual behaviour given the existence o f certain 
institutions. The second chapter o f this thesis tackles the question of why 
the judiciary is characterised by certain inherently costly attributes. This 
contributes to the normative theory o f institutional choice. The last chapter 
deals with the positive question of how institutions are chosen. A model 
is presented where the political alignments in a society are endogenously 
generated and the effect o f varying the informational environment on these 
alignments is analysed. These three chapters collectively contribute to the 
incipient theory of institutions that comprises of two elements; first where the 
existence of institutional structure arises as an equilibrium interplay between 
individual choices and technological and informational constraints, and second 
where conversely, individual games are shaped by the structure o f existing 
institutions.
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Preface
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the normative and positive questions 
surrounding institutional design under asymmetric information. The first 
chapter asks the question of why agents engage in costly dispute resolution 
such as litigation and arbitration when costless settlement is available. It has 
been argued that parties are asymmetrically informed about facts and the law 
surrounding a dispute. This causes the expected payoff from litigation for an 
agent to be unobservable to her opponent. This unobservability can lead to 
the break down of pre-trial bargaining. This approach leaves two fundamental 
questions unanswered: How does informational asymmetry between parties 
survive given the incentives for full disclosure o f certifiable information? 
Does efficient settlement ensue if  parties communicate in forms richer than 
bargaining? To address the first question I argue that pre-trial informational 
asymmetry could arise from inherently non-certifiable information, in particular 
through private valuation of the subject matter in dispute. The second question 
is tackled by adopting a mechanism design framework to show conditions 
under which the only possible equilibrium is one where agents litigate. This 
result arises when parties at the pre-trial stage, lack the ability to fully contract 
away their right to litigate. This in effect induces agents to exaggerate their 
true willingness to litigate in order to increase the settlement their opponents 
are willing to offer. Consequently the credibility o f statements made in pre­
trial negotiations is destroyed and costly dispute resolution emerges as an 
equilibrium phenomenon.
The first chapter supplies a positive analysis o f the existence of costly 
conflict in equilibrium. It shows that if courts do not enforce contracts where 
agents commit not to go to court, then litigation emerges. Consequently the 
question of why court do not enforce waivers emerges as a puzzle. The second 
chapter shows that once the incidence o f disputes is endogenised this puzzle 
disappears. The following trade-off is highlighted: conditional on a dispute 
arising, it is efficient to enforce commitments not to litigate. However, by 
choosing not enforce such commitments, courts can increase surplus since the 
threat of costly litigation deters some disputes from arising in the first place.
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The final chapter, which draws on work that is being jointly carried out 
with Maitreesh Ghatak and Massimo Morelli, explores the issue of how market 
failure interacts with the choice of institutional reform made by an electorate. 
This issue is studied in an occupational choice framework, where agents are 
endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure 
due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that 
affects voting on institutional reform. We find that the preferences of these 
classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between institutional 
reforms that are growth maximising and those that are politically feasible. 
This is in contrast to the world without m arket failure where the electorate 
unanimously votes in favour o f surplus maximising institutional reform. We 
conclude that inefficiencies o f market failure may be further amplified by 
political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market.
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Chapter 1
Why do People Litigate?
1.1 Introduction
Underpinning much of the architecture of neo-classical economics lies the 
assumption of an omniscient judiciary. This judiciary is so efficient that 
it deters undesirable behavior by its very existence. From  Arrow-Debreu 
contingent commodities to incentive contracts, agents perform their legal 
obligations in the knowledge that if  they do not, they will be punished. 
Although invoking the court is costly, this does not lead to an inefficiency 
since even in the unlikely event of a dispute, there is instantaneous resolution 
through bargaining as both parties are aware that taking the dispute to court 
is costly.
This logic creates the paradox of litigation: Why do we observe litigation at 
all when parties are aware of its costliness and costless settlement is available? 
This is the question that is addressed here. I argue that parties have private 
valuation of the subject matter in dispute. This causes the expected payoff 
from litigation to become unobservable to the opponent. At the pre-trial stage 
parties attempt to negotiate a costless resolution of the dispute in the presence 
of this informational asymmetry. The outside option to negotiations is the 
expected payoff from litigation which is increasing in the agent’s valuation of 
the surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to overstate their valuation 
since high valuation agents receive greater settlement offers during negotiations. 
The incentive to exaggerate ones valuation creates a lack of credibility about 
statements made during pre-trial negotiations and consequently causes parties 
to litigate.
In environments where agents are limited in their ability to contract away 
their right to litigate, low valuation agents are wary o f revealing their type 
truthfully. This is because truthful revelation weakens their position as their 
opponents use the revealed information to credibly threaten litigation, and
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consequently get larger shares o f the surplus. In section 1.3.2 I show how 
litigation is prevented if  agents can fully contract away their right to litigate 
at the pre-trial stage. In section 1.5.2 I argue that this explanation for the 
existence of litigation generalises to some other forms conflict as well.
This chapter contributes in two ways to the literature on conflict in general 
and litigation in particular. Firstly it shows the existence of costly dispute 
resolution in equilibrium in a mechanism design framework rather than is 
a more limited bargaining framework, a point discussed in section 1.1.3. 
Secondly, the use of non-certifiable information to generate informational 
asymmetry immunises this model to the full disclosure critique that has 
plagued the literature on litigation. This point is discussed in greater detail in 
section 1.1.2.
1.1.1 First and Second Generation Literature
The large literature that has arisen in response to the question of why people 
litigate is now two generations old. The first generation literature started with 
Landes (1971) who argued that litigation arises when its expected benefit is 
greater than the expected costs for the parties. Parties do not strategically 
interact in the pre-trial stage and litigation is avoided when the expected benefit 
of litigating is lower than the expected cost.
In this literature out of court settlement occurs when parties have similar 
expectations about the outcome of the trial. It is worth explaining this point. 
Uncertainty about the outcome of a trial on its own cannot be the cause 
of litigation. W ith uncertainty, both parties would form expectations about 
what would happen in court. If  the probabilities both associate with winning 
add up to one, they would settle outside thereby saving themselves the cost 
of litigation. Litigation arises for instance if both parties overestimate their 
chances of winning in court. Though this literature acknowledges the role of 
such overestimation in generating litigation, it stops short o f modelling both 
how this overestimation arises and more importantly the strategic behaviour 
of parties when they overestimate the expected payolf from litigation.1
In response to this unresolved issue, a second generation literature has 
arisen starting with P’ng (1983) and Bebchuk (1984). In Bebchuk (1984) the 
defendant knows the probability of winning whereas the plaintiff only knows 
the distribution over the probability of winning. The plaintiff makes an offer 
of settlement which the defendant can accept or reject. If the offer is rejected 
the case goes to court. Since this bargaining game is played out between 
the parties in an environment o f incomplete information, the inefficiency of
'M ore examples include Gould (1973), Posner (1973), and Priest and Klien (1984). More 
recently Yildiz (2003) and Yildiz (2004) formalised how diverging expectations about the 
bargaining process can lead to inefficiencies in settlement.
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litigation arises.2
This is a reflection of the broader theoretical insight that full efficiency is 
not guaranteed with bargaining under incomplete information. In the next two 
subsections the two problems with the second generation literature that this 
chapter seeks to address are explained.
1.1.2 Litigation and Full Disclosure
The first problem concerns the relationship between private information of 
parties and the unobservability o f opponent’s payoff from  litigation. The 
justification given in this literature for private information leading to litigation 
payoffs being unobservable is that a party to a dispute may be in possession of 
information that once revealed in court increases its probability of winning.3 
It is quite plausible that parties would have such information. A defendant in 
a law suit for negligence is likely to have more information than the plaintiff 
about whether she exercised due care. The plaintiff on the other hand is likely 
to have private information about the exact amount of damage he has suffered.
However if parties possess information that is assumed to be certifiable 
in court, parties can choose to reveal it to each other outside court at the 
pre-trial stage. If  parties choose to disclose their private information, they 
find themselves symmetrically informed and consequently litigation is avoided 
through bargaining. The question that arises at this point is; do parties have 
an incentive to reveal their private information before trial? The answer to 
this question is yes even under very weak conditions.
Grossman (1981) shows that when private information is certifiable, there 
are very strong incentives to reveal it. The intuition for this is that when an 
agent has information that is favourable to himself, he would always want 
to reveal it since this leads to better offers from  his opponent. This leads 
to an unravelling in the sense that the agent who chooses not to reveal his 
information ends up signalling that he has unfavourable information4. The
2This result has been generalised in different ways. Schweizer (1989) allows for both parties 
to be in possession private information. Nalebuff (1987) allows for the informed agent to make 
the settlement offer, thereby considering the signalling implications o f  the size o f  the offer and 
its rejection. Spier (1992) considers more stages to bargaining. Friedman and Wittman (2006) 
explore pre-trial settlement when parties employ the Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) protocol 
for bargaining. Although, as noted in Daughety and Reinganum (1994), the predictions o f these 
models vary in terms o f equilibrium allocations for plaintiff and defendant, a non zero probability 
o f litigation emerges as a robust phenomenon. In fact Spier (1994), using a mechanism design 
approach, shows that litigation would arise even when parties bargain using the most efficient 
extensive form. See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Hay and Spier (1998) for surveys o f this 
literature.
3Though the literature has focused on this channel, there are other channels through which 
private information can generate unobservability o f the payoff from litigation. For example even 
if  parties have the same priors but have private valuation o f  the subject matter in dispute, this 
is sufficient for bargaining to be inefficient. What is required is that the expected payoff from 
litigation be private information. Overestimating the probability o f  winning in court is only one 
o f the ways this can happen.
4Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) derive conditions sufficient for this argument to work. Shavell
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existence of litigation in equilibrium in this literature disappears as soon as 
parties can communicate in forms that are richer than bargaining. This is 
because parties would divulge their certifiable information and then bargain 
efficiently in the environment o f complete information.
I propose a different approach by assuming that the asymmetry between 
parties is about information that is inherently non-certifiable. In my model 
the valuation that parties place on the subject m atter in dispute is private 
information. This valuation determines the amount of effort an agent is willing 
to exert in court, which in turn determines the probability o f winning. Hence 
the diverging expectations that parties have about the payoff from litigation are 
endogenously generated here. In contrast to private information on evidence 
which can be certified by the informed agent, declarations o f valuation are 
essentially cheap talk; all types would declare that they have high valuation 
since this increases the settlement offer they are likely to receive. Unlike 
evidence that is certifiable, there may not exist an efficient way to credibly 
display high valuation. High valuation may be credibly revealed only through 
a costly action, like spending more in a trial, that an agent with lower valuation 
will not find optimal.
1.1.3 Litigation and Mechanism Design
The second problem with the literature on litigation is its focus on bargaining 
as a means of resolving disputes outside court. Focusing attention singularly on 
bargaining implies that parties communicate only through offers and counter 
offers. This assumption about the nature of pre-trial negotiation is very 
restrictive since communication between parties is not limited to a sequence 
of offers and counter offers. Communication between parties can include a 
sequence of messages exchanged in a rich language that could in principle 
mitigate the informational asymmetry that exists between parties. Hence by 
restricting the form of pre-trial negotiation to be of the bargaining variety, it 
is possible to miss out on equilibria in which parties settle out o f court.
The model presented here is the first to attempt the resolution of this 
problem using a mechanism design approach. The seminal paper by Myerson 
(1982) shows that an equilibrium of any Bayesian game can be replicated 
through a direct mechanism. This result is known as the revelation principle. 
Using this insight, the result presented here will show that litigation may 
arise even when no restrictions are made about the nature o f communication 
between parties during pre-trial negotiation. Since bargaining under incomplete
(1989) finds that this argument in the setting of litigation leads to certifiable private information 
washing away before trial through voluntary disclosure. Hay (1995) finds the opposite result 
while focusing on laws mandating full disclosure. However he does not consider the possibility 
o f signalling through non-disclosure.
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information is only one of the ways parties could communicate, this is 
subsumed in the model presented here.
1.1.4 Alternative Explanation for Litigation
The Bebchuk (1984) framework has been the most widely accepted one for 
explaining the existence of litigation. However there are other explanations. 
A possible explanation that has received some attention is one based on the 
existence of communication costs. If  the costs o f communication between 
parties are high, then parties would prefer to simply take the matter to court 
rather than settle it between themselves. In fact even if the costs are very 
low, as long as both parties need to pay the costs non-cooperatively to start 
communication, Anderlini and Felli (2001) show that there would always exists 
an equilibrium where communication will not take place. This explanation 
may fit a certain class of litigation. For example it may explain divorce battles 
between spouses where the prospect of communicating with the opponent is 
so odious that costly litigation is preferred.
In a similar vein Robson and Skaperdas (2008) construct a model where 
parties need to pay costs non-coperatively before they can enter the stage of 
pre-trial settlement. These costs influence the probability of winning the case 
and hence influence the outcome of pre-trial bargaining. The idea is that 
parties by committing to litigate may reduce total costs if a substantial part 
of these costs is paid ex-ante before bargaining takes place. This happens 
because committing not to settle dampens the incentive to make costly effort 
ex-ante. However, ju st like in  Anderlini and Felli (2001), once parties are 
allowed to meet before these costs are incurred the result disappears. Since the 
existence of ex-ante costs is the crucial ingredient here, it is difficult to extend 
this explanation to all litigation unless a micro foundation for the existence of 
these costs is supplied.
The model presented here synthesizes the two main approaches used for 
analysing litigation. The literature on pre-trial negotiations treats the court 
process as exogenous.5 In contrast the literature on conflict treats the failure of 
pre-trial negotiation as exogenous and models the court process as a complete 
information contest between two parties where the probability o f winning 
is endogenously determined by the effort exerted by parties.6 This chapter 
combines these two approaches by modeling the court process as a contest in 
an environment o f incomplete information, with a mechanism design stage 
preceding litigation where parties can negotiate to avoid costly litigation.
5 See for example Bebchuk (1984) and Spier (1994)
6 See for example, Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001)
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1.2 Model
There are two agents who find themselves in a dispute. The subject m atter 
o f the dispute is characterised as surplus of size 1 over which agents have 
competing claims. Both agent have positive valuation o f the surplus which 
is their type. Agent 1 ’s valuation is 6 \ which is observable where as agent 
2’s valuation is unobservable and can be 8 % with probability qH and 6% with 
probability qL -  qH .7
if  Agents are aware of their own type before the game begins. The model 
can be easily generalised to the case where the informational asymmetry is 
two-sided, but uncertainty over the type of one agent is sufficient to generate 
litigation in equilibrium. I assume that
6 i > 6 % > 6 2 .
The assumption that valuation of a party is unobservable is the key driver 
of litigation in this model. It is worthwhile to see some examples where 
litigation can be interpreted as a dispute over surplus. These examples have 
been chosen to illustrate how the model may apply to a large range of situations. 
Examples include:
•  Dispute over property: A party has private valuation over a piece of 
property and it is unclear as to who has title over it. The property could 
be tangible such as land or intangible such as an invention.
•  Suits for specific performance: There may be a dispute as to whether 
an agent has performed its contractual obligation. The plaintiff may 
have private valuation over the benefit accruing from the action or the 
defendant may have private valuation over the costs of performing the 
action.
•  Custody battle over children: When a couple separates, the spouses may 
have private valuations over the custody of their children.
Private valuation of the subject matter in dispute is plausible when the 
dispute involves something more than just monetary compensation. The 
model can be extended to cases involving only monetary compensation if the 
assumption of utility functions being linear in money is relaxed. However 
the analysis presented here excludes these cases since the mechanism design 
problem becomes less tractable if the utility of parties is nonlinear in transfers.
7An earlier draft allowed both parties to have private information on valuation. The assumption 
of one sided asymmetric information is preferred since it has two advantages. Firstly it simplifies 
the model and delivers a clear intuition about the result. Secondly, it demonstrates how the 
mechanics that drive the result are not the ones subsumed in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
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Timeline:
Stage 1: Agent 2 realises his private valuation of the surplus.
Stage 2: A dispute arises between the 2 parties.
Stage 3: Parties to dispute start pre-trial negotiation which is a game that may 
help them avoid taking the matter to court.
Stage 4: Parties play the game from stage 2 and receive the equilibrium allocation.
Stage 5: Parties non-cooperatively choose between the equilibrium allocation 
from stage 2 and approaching the court.
Stage 6: If either agent has approached the court, then both non co-operatively 
choose their effort levels.
Stage 7: Court observes the effort o f each agent and makes a final decision.
It is helpful at this point to preview how the result of litigation in equi­
librium is established. A t stage 3 in the model agents undertake pre-trial 
negotiations which formally is a game that will help them avoid litigation. 
This game yields some equilibrium in stage 4. Due to the revelation principle 
it is possible to characterise the existence o f litigation in this equilibrium 
without specifying the actual game in stage 3. This is because the revelation 
principle allows for the replication of any equilibrium of a Bayesian through 
a direct mechanism. I will first prove the non-existence of a separating and 
semi-separating equilibrium. In particular I will show that when agents cannot 
contract away their right to litigate at stage 3, an incentive to lie for a low 
valuation agent 2 arises. This is because he anticipates that if his declare their 
types truthfully, their opponent would force him  to re negotiate the alloca­
tion from stage 4 with a credible threat o f litigation. This implies that the 
only possible equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium where all agents declare 
themselves to have a high valuation. I will show that in this equilibrium 
litigation arises since agent 1 has a higher expected payoff from litigation than 
the settlement payoff from stage 4 under certain conditions. In section 1.3.2 
I show how litigation disappears in equilibrium when the ability to contract 
away the right to litigate is introduced.
This model can be solved starting backwards. In the next subsection a 
stylized model o f litigation is presented. This is m eant to crudely capture 
what happens in court. Since parties know what would happen in court, the 
equilibrium allocations from the game they play in stage 3 must at least make 
parties indifferent between litigating and not litigating in stage 4. I call this a 
litigation-proofness constraint. This constraint is derived in section 1.2.2 for 
the different kinds of equilibria. Going back another step, in section 1.2.3 the
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incentive-compatibility constraints for different equilibria are derived. Finally 
in section 1.3 I present the result that shows the existence of litigation in 
equilibrium.
1.2.1 Litigation
In line with the large literature on the question of why conflict occurs, the 
court process is modeled as a static contest where the probability o f winning 
is determined by the effort x  exerted by parties.8 Following are the objective 
functions of the two agents.
Q\ P(jci, X2) -  x\ and 0^(1 -  P(jci, JC2)) — X2 j  € {L, H }
where 6 \ is the valuation of agent 1 and 0  ^ is the valuation o f agent 2. Note 
that henceforth j  refers to the type o f agent 2. This formulation assumes 
that the payoff of parties is linear in money (effort). It is assumed that the 
probability of winning is increasing in ones own effort and decreasing in the 
effort o f the opponent.
Effort can be thought of as fees of the lawyer hired by an agent If  lawyers 
are paid in proportion to their marginal product then it must be the case that 
the heterogeneity in the fees lawyers charge can be explained by the degree of 
persuasiveness they have in court. Apart from the sensitivity o f the judicial 
process to the skills of a lawyer, it is also possible to have an interpretation 
of effort in terms o f how much money is paid off to a corrupt judiciary to 
secure a favourable decision9.
If the valuation of agent 2 was observable, then this would be a game of 
complete information where we could compute the Nash equilibrium effort 
levels o f the agents. Here, since his valuation is private information, agent 1 
instead plays a Bayesian game where the optimal effort level of agent 1 is:
*1 (0i) = argmax 0i V  qj  P (* i, x 1{6 j1)) 
■t > -°  V/ef H,L)
- Xj. (1.1)
Having computed the Bayesian Nash equilibrium effort levels agent 1, we can 
work out the expected payoff from litigation for agent 1. This is
8 See Skaperdas (2006) for surveys o f this literature.
9 A  contest function is not necessary for the results o f  this chapter. W hat is required is that 
l im ^ Q P (0 ] ,0 ^ )  -»  1 and lim ^ -,0 P(0 | , 6^ ) -»  0. The contest function specified later delivers
this in a reduced form through the equilibrium efforts o f the agents. The attraction o f  using a 
contest function is that it allows the model to endogenise litigation effort and consequently the 
inefficiency o f litigation.
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vi(0j) = 0 \ - Xl(0 i). (1.2)
Since agent 1 ’s valuation is observable, agent 2 ’s equilibrium effort level is
x 2(eJ2) = aigm ax9]2 P (xi(di),X2(eJ2) ) - X 2  je { H ,L ) .  (1.3)
*2^ 0
Plugging these effort levels back into the objective function, we get the 
expected payoff from litigation for agent 2 which is
v j(^ ) = ^  P (jt! (» i) ,J2 (^ ))- ii(e { )  j e { H , L ) .  (1.4)
Inspecting equation (1.2) we can already see how private information can 
lead to agent 1 overestimating her probability o f winning in court. This could 
happen when agent 2 has high valuation. But agent 1, taking expectations 
over the type of agent 2, would believe him to have an average valuation. The 
value function can be re-written as
vj(0i) = 0i (P (jci(0i ) , jc2(6^))) -  *i(0i).
It can be seen that the sum of the expectation over the probability of winning 
for agent 1 and the that of a high valuation agent 2 can be greater than 1.
This is not the only feature that makes the payoff of one agent unobservable 
to the other. In addition to affecting the probability, the type also enter the 
payoff function directly as the value placed on the surplus, and indirectly 
through the equilibrium effort of the agent. The inability of agent 1 to observe 
agent 2’s expected payoff from litigation, generates the existence of litigation 
in equilibrium. If this contest was played in an environm ent o f complete 
information, then expected payoffs from litigation would be common knowledge. 
This would allow parties to bargain around costly litigation since the opponent’s 
outside option to bargaining would be observable. The unobservability of types 
causes the outside option to bargaining being unobservable and consequently, 
as shown by Schweizer (1989), full efficiency is no longer attainable with 
bargaining.
At this point one may naturally ask why parties should restrict themselves 
to bargaining as a pre-trial mechanism to avoid litigating? Why can they not 
design any other mechanism that will allow agent 2 to reveal his valuation? I 
address this question in the next subsection.
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1.2.2 Litigation-Proofness
Before resorting to costly litigation parties can play any Bayesian game such 
that the type of agent 2 will stand revealed. This problem of a general game 
form is tractable using the revelation principle since any equilibrium in a 
Bayesian game can be replicated by the use of a direct mechanism where the 
parties reveal their types truthfully to a mediator. To see whether litigation 
can be avoided, we need to check whether a more efficient allocation that does 
not require external financing is implementable10.
The equilibrium allocation that is replicated using a direct mechanism 
needs to be litigation-proof. This means that the payoff from the equilibrium 
should be weakly greater than the payoff from litigation. The expected payoff 
from litigation depends on the nature of equilibrium we try to implement using 
the direct mechanism. This problem can be tackled by considering different 
kinds of equilibria separately.
Separating Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium the valuations of the agent 2 would stand revealed 
in stage 4. Consequently parties would find themselves in an environment 
of complete information. At this stage parties should prefer the allocations 
that have been prescribed by the mechanism to litigation. I f  parties choose 
to litigate at this stage, their payoffs would be the Nash equilibrium payoff 
from litigation under complete information. The Nash equilibrium levels o f 
effort that would be played when an agent 1 meets an agent 2 o f type j  can 
be computed. Let these be xj and x*2:
x{ = argmax 6 i P (xi, x£) -  xi and x *2 = argmax 0^( 1 -  P(x{, X2)) ~ *2-
* 1 > 0  X2> 0
These may not be unique.11 Using these optimal effort levels we can calculate 
vj, the expected payoff from litigation when agent 1 confronts a type j  agent 
2 .
Vj = 6 1 P(x{, x j) -  x{ vj = flj(l -  P(xj, x j)) -  x j (1.5)
Although parties would never actually litigate in an environment of com­
plete information, vi and V2 become credible threat points that parties would
10It is reasonable to im pose the restriction o f  no external financing since parties in the real 
world cannot expect outside subsidies for settlement o f  private disputes. If budget balance is 
not imposed then the problem would disappear since a Groves mechanism would always ensure 
incentive-compatibility. See Groves (1973).
11 In the results when a functional form for the contest function is specified, conditions that 
ensure uniqueness are presented.
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use to force the renegotiation o f allocations ex-post. In other words, bar­
gaining would ensue in states of the world where parties find that they are 
guaranteed a higher expected payoff by litigating rather than accepting the 
allocations specified by the mechanism. W hile being completely agnostic 
about the extensive form that such bargaining would take, we know that vi 
and V2 will be the outside options to such bargaining. If  parties anticipate that 
such bargaining will take place ex-post, this destroys existence of a separating 
equilibrium unless the allocations are designed to ensure that parties cannot 
credibly threaten litigation in stage 5. Hence to avoid a credible threat of 
litigation the transfers from the mechanism must satisfy litigation-proofness 
constraints. These are
01 (1.6)
for j  € {H, L } where is the net transfer paid by agent 1 to type j  agent 2 
in the event the mechanism allocates the surplus to agent 1. Similarly is 
the net transfer paid by type j  agent 2 to agent 1 in the event the mechanism 
allocates the surplus to agent 2. The constraints state that the payoff from 
negotiations should be greater than the payoff from litigating. This should be 
true for both the agents regardless o f who receives the surplus, and for all 
realisations of agent 2 ’s type.
Pooling Equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium the agent 1 learns nothing about the type of agent 2 
at stage 4. Hence their expected payoff from litigation remains the Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium payoff vi(0i) and V2(0£) defined in equations (1.2) and (1.4). 
Let the n\ and fj.2 be the transfer made by agents 1 and 2 respectively to 
their opponent when the surplus is allocated to them. The litigation-proofness 
constraints are
01 -  vi(0,) > n \ > v2 (0 }2) (1.7)
9J2 - v 2(0}2) > f i 2 > vi(0i)
W hat defines a pooling equilibrium is that the declaration of agent 2 
conveys no information about his type. Consequently there is no change in 
agent l ’s prior about the type of agent 2. Note that in terms of the declarations
that agent 2 makes, there are various ways in which a pooling equilibrium can
arise. It arises when agent 2 makes the same declaration regardless of his type. 
More generally, it arises whenever agent 2 has the same probability distribution 
over declarations regardless of his type. W hat is im portant here is that the
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constraints defined in (1.7) are unaffected by which pooling equilibrium we 
consider. This is because the payoff from litigation v2(0^), which is the outside 
option to fj.2 , remains constant.
Semi-Separating Equilibrium
Just like in the case of pooling equilibria, there are infinitely many semi- 
separating equilibria that can arise. A semi-separating equilibrium is defined 
by the fact that there is some information conveyed to agent 1 through the 
declaration of agent 2. Hence the payoff from litigation thereafter is modified 
since agent 1 uses updated probabilities when deciding his optimal effort level 
in court. Let the optimal effort of agent 1 and 2 be Jci and Jt2 where
The value of y  e  (0 ,1) is determined by the posterior probability that agent 
1 associates with agent 2 being a low type. Note that y  is a short hand for 
the amount of information that is revealed to agent 1 by agent 2’s declaration. 
If the declaration reveals nothing then y  = \  and we are back in a pooling 
equilibrium. W hen y  = 0 agent 1 knows the that agent 2 is a high type with 
certainty and we are in a separating equilibrium. Similarly y  = 1 implies that 
we are in a separating equilibrium where agent 2 has been revealed to be a 
low type. The intermediate value of y  strictly between 0 and 1 but not equal 
to one half are ones that would arise in a semi-separating equilibrium.
Using the semi-separating equilibrium effort levels calculated above we 
can back out the litigation value functions for agent 1 and 2. These are vi, 
and Vj respectively.
xi = argmax 0i
xi> 0 \
(1.8)
x% = argmax 0^(1 -  P (* i,x 2)) -  *2 , (1.9)
X2>0
and
= argmax 0^(1 -  P(Jfi, x2)) -  x2. ( 1.10)
* 2 > 0
P(JE,.4))-*,. (1.11) 
(1.12)v f  = e%( l -P (x i,x % )) -x% ,
and
X>2 = 0^(1 -  POCi.xf)) -  Jt£. (1.13)
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We care now ready to characterise the litigation-proofness constraints in a 
semi-separating equilibrium. These are
61 -  V] > fa  > v{ (1.14)
$2 ~  vJ2 > fa  > vi
where fa  and fa  are the transfers made to the opponent when the surplus is 
allocated to agent 1 and 2 respectively.
1.2.3 Incentive-Compatibility Constraints for a Separating 
Equilibrium
Consider a direct mechanism where agent 2 declares a type j  where j  € {H,L}.
If the declarations of agent 2 6 J2, then agent 1 is allocated the surplus with
probability 6 * and agent 2 is allocated allocated the surplus with probability 
1 -  6 j . Following are the incentive-compatibility constraints for agent 2 in a 
separating equilibrium.
H2 : + (1 -  - t ” )>  6 Lt \  + (1 -  6l)(0% -  %) (1.15)
fa  : SLt\  + (1 -  6l)(6% - % ) >  + (1 ~ 6H)(e% -  # )
The exercise here is to find an allocation composed of transfers fj, ^  along 
with probability that satisfies incentive-compatibility and litigation-proofness 
for all j .  If  such an allocation exists then parties would reveal their types 
truthfully knowing that for any possible realisation o f types, the allocation 
guarantees that the opponent cannot credibly threaten litigation ex-post.
Since 6 j can be less than one, there will be states when the surplus is 
allocated to agent 2 even though agent 1 always has greater valuation of the 
surplus than agent 2. If this happens both agents could voluntarily renegotiate 
and allocate the surplus to agent 1 in exchange of a transfer for agent 2. Since 
agents are aware that this will happen in all states when the surplus is allocated 
to the agent with the higher valuation, this has to be taken into account while 
implementing the separating equilibrium allocation.
Lem m a 1.1. The non-existence o f  transfers satisfying litigation-proofness and 
incentive-compatibility fo r  6 j = 1 is sufficient fo r  proving the non existence o f  
transfers fo r  any € [0,1] i f  agents are allowed to trade the surplus once it 
is allocated.
P roof In a separating equilibrium, the type of agent 2 corresponds to his 
declaration. Assume that the surplus is allocated to agent 2. In this state
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agents would find it profitable to allocate the surplus to agent 1 in exchange 
of a transfer to agent 2. Let this transfer be r[. The condition
0 ] - ^ > f J > 0 ^ - t (  (1.16)
(1.16) must be satisfied for agents to voluntarily agree on trade of the surplus 
for transfer f7. Using (1.16) and the litigation-proofness constraints from (1.6) 
we have
f[ > 9^ — > v2.
0i -  v7 > 0i -  ^  ^  *?•
This implies that if no t[ exists that satisfies
01 -  v7 > fj > v7
then there cannot exist a that satisfies (1.16). Note that this larger range for 
is the same as the one imposed on t[ by (1.6).
In a state where the declaration o f 2 is j ,  the term  in the incentive- 
compatibility constraint for agent 2 modifies to
6 Jt{ + (1 -  6 ^  -  r7) = 6 Jt{ + (1 -  5 %
which can be replaced with t[ w ithout loss of generality since 6 \ + 6 ^  = 1 
and the range for both transfers is the same. Therefore the non existence of 
fj7 that satisfies incentive-compatibility and litigation-proofness for 8 l{ = 1, is 
sufficient for proving the non existence of t\], t1^ for any <J'7 € [0,1]. □
Lemma 1 tells us that given agents will voluntarily trade the surplus 
when it is allocated to the agent with the lower valuation. We can therefore, 
without loss o f generality, focus our attention on the direct mechanism that 
always allocates the surplus to the agent with the higher valuation. Applying 
Lemma 1.16 to Case 1 where the distribution of valuations do not intersect, we 
have 6 ^ H = 6 ^ L = 8 \ L = 6 \ H = 1. This simplifies the incentive-cmpatibility 
constraints of agent 2 to
= (117)
The intuition for this condition is the following. Since agent 2 knows that 
finally the surplus will always go to agent 1, he has an incentive to make 
the declaration that guarantees him the maximum possible transfer. The only 
way to incentivize him  to tell the truth is to make the transfer independent 
of his declaration. The results will show how this restrictions placed on
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the range of transfers may be inconsistent with the range for transfers in the 
litigation-proofness constraints derived in section 1.2.2.
The ability to trade surplus ex-post simplifies the analysis by allowing us 
to focus on efficient allocations, that is allocations where surplus goes to the 
agent 1. The introduction of trade however is is not the driver of the results of 
the model, it merely simplifies the analysis. It will be seen that what creates 
litigation is the inability of parties to fully contract away their right to litigate. 
In the extension, I show that even if parties can commit not to trade, litigation 
may still arise as long as certain conditions are satisfied.
1.3 Results
In this section main result regarding the existence of litigation in equilibrium 
is proven. In the next two subsections the existence o f litigation in two 
extreme cases of full commitment and complete non-contractability is discussed. 
Thereafter the implications of partial contractibility on existence of litigation 
are analysed.
1.3.1 Litigation under Non-Contractability
It is difficult to proceed further without pinning down a functional form for 
the contest function. This allows for a computation of the value function vi 
and V2. The contest function that is used here is
P(*1, s2) = - T ■ ^ a e ( 0, l ) .  (1.18)ax'l + (1 -  a)x$
Skaperdas (1996) provides the axiomatic foundations of this contest func­
tion for the case of a  equal to Clark and Riis (1998) generalise this to the 
case where a  takes any value between zero and one. This contest function 
is unique in that the winning probability depends on the ratio of equilibrium 
efforts12 It differs from the exponential contest function where the winning 
probability depends on the difference of the efforts exerted by parties. This 
function is easily parameterised, and allows a closed form characterisation 
of the value functions for both agents. X less than 1 implies concavity and 
ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium.
The primary parameter that characterises the function is X. This captures 
how sensitive the probability is to the effort exerted by parties. A  higher
12Strictly, what is required for the arguments in this chapter to go through, is that 
lim0,_,o = 0 and l im ^ o  = 1. This is what the contest function in (1.18)
delivers in the reduced form when the equilibrium effort levels as a function o f  valuations are 
computed. This is in contrast to the exponential contest function atxpAx^e^ ]_ ^ exph 2 where this 
property does not hold.
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A implies a greater sensitivity of the judicial process to the persuasiveness 
of lawyers. A judicial process completely insensitive to the skill o f lawyers 
implies a A equal to 0. Alternatively a high responsiveness o f the probability 
of winning to effort could simply mean that it is cheap and easy to bribe 
judges. In this interpretation A can be thought of as a param eter capturing 
how corrupt the judiciary is. In this interpretation A equal to 0 implies an 
incorruptible judiciary since the decision o f the court is insensitive to bribes.
The point of departure from Skaperdas (1996) for this contest function is 
the presence of the additional parameter a  which captures how strong agent 
l ’s case is ex-ante relative to agent 2. This parameter is introduced to capture 
the fact that legal disputes may be skewed towards one side. It is rarely the 
case that both sides to a dispute have equally strong legal positions.
An a  equal to 1 implies that agent 1 is certain to win the case; that the 
case is ‘open and shut’. Similarly a  equal to 0 implies that agent 2 is certain 
to win. Note that in these two corner cases the efforts of parties will not play 
a role as the probability o f winning would be insensitive to effort. Note that 
if  a  is either 0 or 1 there would never be any litigation since one of the two 
parties regardless o f its valuation would have an observable payoff o f 0 from 
litigation and hence would always settle for 0 outside. For intermediate values 
of a, the effort o f parties would influence the probability o f winning. An a  
equal to one half implies that if both agents were to exert the same effort, the 
outcome of the case is equiprobable.
a  is a reduced form catchall parameter that captures both the legal char­
acteristics and the facts o f the dispute. The following examples illustrate 
this.
•  In a custody battle, the laws of most countries usually favour the mother. 
If  this is the case then a  would be greater than one half when agent 
1 is the mother. The value a  would depend on the specific laws on 
custody of children of the country in which the dispute takes place. The 
value of a  would also depend on the facts of the particular case. If for 
example, agent 1 is known to have a history o f drug problems then a  
would be lower.
•  In a battle over intellectual property agent 2, the alleged infringer, may 
or may not have the right to contest the validity o f the patent. For 
example, in the UK a patent can be challenged only once in a court 
o f law. If  it is upheld, agent 1 the holder o f the patent, is granted 
a certificate of contested validity which protects it from  any further 
challenges. Hence the question of whether the law allows more than one 
challenge to the patent, along with the factual position of whether or 
not the patent in question has been previously challenged, may together
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affect a.
•  In a suit for specific performance if the provisions of the contract make 
a clear case in favour of the plaintiff then this brings a  closer to 1. On 
the other hand if it can be shown that the contract is in violation of 
public policy then the contract would be set aside and the defendant 
would not be called upon to perform his contractual obligations. This 
would push a  closer to zero.
Following the discussion on disclosure in the introduction, even if facts of 
the case are private information to begin with, as long as they are certifiable, 
they would be revealed before litigation takes place and would influence a. 
Hence a  like X is common knowledge. In a world where given a set of 
facts there is no room for disagreement about the application of the law, and 
consequently the outcome of the case is certain, a  would always either be 
0 or 1. However this is never the case since the interpretation o f the law is 
often contentious. Even if the interpretation o f the individual laws is clear, 
there may be ambiguity about which law is to be applied to the case at hand.
In addition to the fact that the application of the law is inherently uncertain 
due to complexity of the specific case to which it is applied, there could be 
perverse incentives in judicial systems that increases this uncertainty even 
further. Levy (2005) argues that career concerns could induce judges to 
contradict previous decisions consequently creating uncertainty about the law. 
This creates a role for lawyer’s skill since courts are open to persuasion.
Apart from the lawyer’s skill in persuading the court on points o f law, 
there is also often room for persuasion on points of fact. What truly happened 
at a point in the past is often unobservable and exists only as a probability 
distribution for the court. A lawyer’s skill could therefore play a role in 
influencing what the court believes to be true about an event. All this creates 
uncertainty about the outcome of the case which can lead to a realisation of 
a  that is not 0 or 1.
Using this contest function it is possible to solve out for the Nash equilib­
rium effort levels when agent 1 confronts a type j  agent 2.
(d id r fa il  - a ) X  , .. { O ^ Y a iX  -  a)X
jcj =01
The corresponding value functions are:
( 1.20)
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and
(SO-1 + (fiiY  M e i Y  + a - a M W )
Inspecting these value functions confirms certain desirable properties.
The effort an agent exerts in court is increasing in her own type. This is 
intuitive since a greater valuation makes an agent more active in court since 
there’s more at stake for her. Conversely the payoff of an agent is decreasing 
in the opponent’s valuation.
The expected payoff from litigation is monotonically increasing in own valua­
tion and decreasing in the valuation of the opponent. This is a consequence 
of the property in (1.21).
As the agent’s valuation goes to 0, so does her payoff from litigation. On the 
other hand an agent’s litigation payoff goes to her valuation as the valuation 
of the opponent goes to zero. This is the case since facing an opponent with 
low valuation implies that even a small effort is sufficient for securing a high 
probability o f winning.
Non-Existence of a S eparating  Equilibrium
Using the value functions defined above it is now possible to prove the non 
existence of a separating equilibrium. Litigation-proofness constraints impose 
restrictions on the transfer of the mechanism that parties design for pre-trial 
settlement o f dispute. The following result shows that these restrictions may 
be inconsistent with the restrictions imposed by incentive-compatibility.
P roposition 1.1. Assuming that P(jcj , JC2) in equation  (1.18) is the contest 
function that characterises litigation; a separating equilibrium does not exist 
i f  0% — 0% is greater than some threshold A.
Proof. We have
( 1.21)
dvi
T < 0 . (1.22)
lim vi = 0 and 
<^ -»o
lim v{ = 6 \ . 
0
(1.23)
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from equation (1.6). Using this together with (1.23) we get
lim rf = 0.
From (1.17) we have t \  = And from (1.6) we have > v%. Since > 0 
from  equation (1.20), when 6% > 0. Given the monotonicity property in 
equation (1.22), there must exist a threshold A such that for 6% -  6 % > A, 
r[ = cannot be satisfied. Hence a separating equilibrium does not exist. □
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If the minimum transfer that 
a high type agent 2 receives from agent 1 is large enough, then the incentive 
for a low type agent 2 to tell the truth is destroyed. W ith the contest function 
specified in (1.18), this happens as 6£ goes to zero. This is because the effort 
levels depend on the ratio of the valuations. As 6 % goes to zero the payoff 
from litigation for a low type agent 2 also goes to zero and the likelihood that 
agent 1 wins in court goes to 1. This in turn restricts the transfers a low type 
agent 2 can expect from the mechanism. Once 6^  is sufficiently far apart from 
0 %, that is when the difference between the two valuations is large enough, 
it becomes more attractive for a low type agent 2 to declare him self to be a 
high type.
The Existence of L itigation in the Pooling E qu ilib rium
Proposition 1.1 shows that a separating equilibrium cannot exist when 0% -6% > 
A. This leaves open the possibility of the existence o f a pooling and a semi- 
separating equilibrium. In this sub-section, it will be shown that a litigation 
free pooling equilibrium cannot exist. For litigation to exist, agent 1 should 
prefer litigating when offered the alternative of allowing agent 2 to pool across 
his types. The next result shows that this is indeed the case when qL the 
probability o f agent 2 being a low type is greater than some threshold.
P roposition 1.2. There exists a threshold qL* such that fo r  any c f f  < q \  < 1 
agent 1 chooses to litigate rather than accept the pa yo ff from  a pooling  
equilibrium.
Proof In a pooling equilibrium, the optimal effort for agent 1 when she 
litigates is:
Note that the objective function is concave in x\ since it is a sum of two concave 
functions. Hence the first order condition yields the optimum. Plugging in 
the optimal effort levels we get the expected payoff from litigation for agent 1:
jci(0i ) = argmaxfli
ir. SA je{H,L) <*■*} +  ( !  - a ) x 2 { e j2 Y >
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vi(0i) -  0 \ 
Now note that:
y ^2—
,M h!l) a x \ (01 y1 +  (1 -  a ) x 1{e ]1Y  J
lim JC2(0^) = 0.
^-*0
This is true because if the limit of X2(0%) is a positive constant then the 
expected payoff from litigation for the agent would be negative. This is a 
contradiction of X2 (0f) being an optimum since the agent could reduce X2 and 
increase his payoff to 0.
lim vi(0i) = 0i
The minimum transfer that an agent 2 with a high declaration is guaranteed 
to accept from an agent 1 as settlement outside court is V2(0 %). Since agent 2 
would always declare himself to be a high type, the payoff for agent 1 from 
playing the mechanism and accepting its allocation is 0i -  V2(0%) < 6 \ .
Note that the first order condition for the Bayesian game converges to the 
first order condition of the game with complete information where agent 2 is 
a low type:
lim V  ; 0 ! ( l-a )x ^ ~ 1x2(9J2)A 1 <*(1 - a i ) x \ - x(x%)x __
, ^ f L) q (a x f  + (1 -  a )x2(0 }2)A) 2 + 0  -  <*)(x%)A) 2 M i '
This implies that the optimal effort in the game with incomplete information 
converges to the optimal effort in the game with com plete information as 
qL -» 1. Since the expected payoff from litigation goes to 0i as qL —* 1 and 
6 % —* 0 there must exist a threshold for qL* such that:
4 z
\ M H , L
&x\ (0i y*
<r---------------- - * l ( 0 l )  = 01 -  v f.
U(wi} + (1 -  <*)x2 (.o}2)a ,
This defines q!f. Note that for any 1 > q% > q%* litigation has a higher 
expected payoff for agent 1 when agent 2 always declares himself to be a high 
type. □
Given that a low type agent 2 is sure to declare him self to be a high 
type, agent 1 has two options; she can either accept the pooling equilibrium 
allocation from  the negotiations or she can litigate. If  the likelihood that 
the opponent she faces is a low type is high enough, she will always prefer 
to litigate as her payoff from litigation goes to 0i whereas her payoff from 
settling outside court through negotiations is at most 0i -  V2(0^).
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The Existence of Litigation in a Sem i-Seperating E quilib rium
I will now show that the logic that creates the existence of litigation in 
a pooling equilibrium generalises to create the existence o f litigation in a 
semi-separating equilibrium.
Proposition 1.3. When the conditions o f  proposition 1.1 are satisfied, a 
semi-separating equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof. Note that in a semi-separating equilibrium the transfer to agent 2 must 
be independent of his declaration. If  not the agent would have an incentive 
make the declaration that gets him the higher transfer. This transfer is p i 
and it must satisfy the litigation-proofness constraints defined in (1.14). This 
implies
01 - P i  >  v i
and
P i  >  v ”  >  v £ .
qH(i-y)+qi.y 
objective function for agent 1
Let = 1 -  y. In the limit as 6% —► 0 this yields the following
:
s i n c e
lim jc£ = 0.
0£->O
The corresponding value function for a high type agent 2 is
2 ax]  + (1 -  a)x] 2
for a high type agent 2. Solving for the optimal effort levels and plugging 
them back into the objective function of agent 2 we get
Ud -  m y +wy w d  -  m y + o  -  aye"yy
Note that v~ = v? for y  = 0, where v? is the separating equilibrium litigation 
payoff for a high type agent 2 defined in (1.20). Furtherm ore since
f  <0.
Keeping ji\ > v% > v% > 0 there exists a threshold q^L such that for 
q \ > 0*2 a8ent 1 would prefer to litigate than to settle with a transfer of jl\ to 
agent 2. This is true since v\ -» 0\ as q \ -* 1 Hence the maximum transfer 
that agent 1 is willing to make to avoid litigation is lower than the minimum
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needed to satisfy the litigation-proofness constraint of a high type agent 2 and 
litigation arises in equilibrium. □
The intuition for this result is similar to the previous result. In a semi- 
separating equilibrium agent 2 must receive a transfer independent o f his 
declaration. This transfer must be greater than the minimum transfer required 
for keeping a high type agent 2 indifferent between litigation and settlement. 
However, as the likelihood of agent 2 being a low type increases, agent 1 
prefers to litigate and ‘take his chances’ rather than pay out a high settlement.
Propositions 1.1, 1.3, and 1.2 taken together establish the existence of 
litigation in equilibrium. In a nutshell Proposition 1.1 shows that under certain 
conditions agent 2 would always lie about his type in any negotiation for 
pre-trial settlement. Hence it would not be possible for agents to resolve their 
informational asymmetry. Propositions 1.2 and 1.3 show that since agent 1 
knows about this, she would prefer litigation to settling outside court. The 
results hold when the difference between 6% and 0 2 is large and the value of 
is high enough. If these conditions are satisfied, agents have no option but 
to litigate.
1.3.2 Full Waiver of the Right to Litigate
As we would expect, if  parties can contract away their right to litigate then 
this turns out to be sufficient to avoid litigation.
Proposition 1.4. There always exists an unsubsidised and incentive compatible 
allocation that Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation under litigation.
Proof. Litigation is a Bayesian game, where the allocation is composed of 
the probabilities of the surplus being transferred to the two agents for the two 
possible types of agent 2 and the corresponding transfers. Using the revelation 
principle, any equilibrium allocation under litigation can be replicated by a 
direct mechanism that specifies probabilities o f acquiring the surplus for 
agent 1 and f 2 for a type j  agent 2 and transfers x\ and x*2. The incentive- 
compatibility constraints for agent 2 are
62^2 ~ P i) > ~ *2 > ^ i)P 2 ~Pi)
where
4 > 0 ,  j  € {H, L),
since litigation is costly. Similarly x\ is the cost o f litigation for agent 1. 
Consider an allocation where the probabilities f 2 are preserved and litigation 
costs are replaced by the following transfers from agent 2 to 1
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*2 ~ @2^2 P2)  *1 ^  — X\
By construction we have
^2^2 ~ *2 > ^2^2 ~  -*2-
This allocation is unsubsidised by a third party, incentive compatible, and 
preferred by both agents over litigation since the expected transfers they make 
are strictly lower than the costs of litigation. □
Note that the phrase ‘Pareto dominance’ is used here in the interim 
sense. Since litigation is simply a Bayesian game, applying the revelation 
principle, the equilibrium allocation of litigation can be replicated using a 
direct mechanism. Proposition 1.4 states that in fact, using a direct mechanism, 
a superior allocation can be implemented without having to subsidize the 
implemetation externally. Given litigation is costly for all parties, it is easy 
to see why this result obtains. The probabilities with which agents expect to 
win in court can be replicated in a direct mechanism. Compared to litigation 
this allocation reduces the amount of resources that are burnt for separation 
of types.
Proposition 1.4 implies that under full contractability litigation would 
never occur since it would be individually rational for agents to contract 
on a mechanism that guarantees a better allocation. In a world with full 
commitment, agents could write a contract wherein they commit to sticking 
with the allocation that the mechanism specifies. In such a world it would not 
be possible for agents to credibly threaten the other agent with litigation ex-post 
to force the renegotiation of the allocation. Hence these separating equilibrium 
allocations need not satisfy the additional constraint o f litigation-proofness. 
This proposition is obvious when seen in the light o f the well understood 
theoretical insight that the possibility of renegotiation ex-post creates incentive 
problems ex-ante13.
1.3.3 Litigation Under Partial Waiver
The discussion in the preceding section raises the question of whether litigation 
would arise if  a limited ability, to contract away their right to litigate, was 
available to agents. The degree of commitment available to parties can be 
thought of as a point in a continuum that is bounded by full contractibility 
on one end and complete non-contractibility on the other. A  natural way to 
capture the partial commitment in the contest function specified in (1.18) is 
through a. Once agents sign a contract to stick to the allocations specified
,3See for example Weitzman (1976).
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by the mechanism it affects a  when the case reaches court ex-post. In the 
world with complete contractibility, when agent 1 considers approaching the 
court ex-post, she would find that a  equals 0. This means that agents would 
know that approaching the court in violation o f the commitment to stay out 
of court would invite a certain ruling in favour o f the opponent. The world 
with imperfect commitment, would be one where the value of a  would change 
but the change would still not be sufficient to bring about complete certainty 
about the outcome of the case, that is, a  ex-post would still be between 0 and
1. The result in Proposition 1.1 shows that w ith a low enough valuation for 
the low type, as long as or is strictly between 0 and 1, it would not be possible 
to satisfy incentive-compatibility. Hence as long as com plete com mitm ent 
is not available, it is possible to still apply propositions 1.1 and 1.2, and 
consequently justify the existence of litigation.
The area of law that governs the right o f parties to contract away their 
rights, in this case the right to judicial remedy, is called waiver. W hether 
a waiver is valid is itself a contentious issue in law. Among other things, 
the court would verify whether “functional equivalence” , that is some other 
form of judicial process was available to the agents. I f  the mechanism for 
resolving disputes looks fairly close to a judicial process, then court would be 
more likely to uphold the allocations. For example arbitral awards are open 
to appeal on very limited grounds. The problem  with arbitration however 
is that in terms of the technology of decision m aking it is identical to the 
court. Therefore designing a settlement mechanism comes with the following 
tradeoff; the allocation it specifies is more likely to be upheld the more the 
mechanism resembles a court but this makes the mechanism costly in itself. 
This model does not explain when parties would choose arbitration or litigation 
but provides an explanation for why dispute resolution can be inherently costly.
The court would also look into the bargaining power between parties when 
it decides whether to uphold the mechanism designed by parties.14 Since 
bargaining power is not verifiable, the decision of the court on the validity 
of waiver itself is subject to the same technology of decision making. This 
would mean that parties would have to take into account litigation-proofness 
constraints even when they add clauses waiving their right to litigate.
There could be several reasons why courts do not always enforce what 
contracting parties agree on ex-ante. There could be behavioural reasons 
for not allowing agents to tie themselves into contracts that are detrimental 
to them in the future. For example it is easy to see why court would void 
contracts where an agent sells himself in slavery to another.
There could also be efficiency based reasons. Anderlini et al. (2006b)
,4An exposition o f  factors that courts usually take into account in the U S while deciding on 
the legitimacy o f waivers is discussed in Yale Law (1978) and Rubin (1980-1981)
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argue that by committing to void certain contracts the court increases ex-ante 
efficiency. It is possible that similar considerations induce judges to void 
contracts where agents contract away their right to litigate. For example, 
consider a stage 0 that occurs in the tim eline before the dispute arises. In 
this stage one of the two parties can take an action that is privately costly 
but which stops the dispute from arising. Now assume that a dispute comes 
with some inherent costs for both parties once it arises even if  it is resolved 
efficiently. In the case of property disputes these can be thought o f as the 
opportunity cost o f sitting down to negotiate with the other agent. In case of 
a custody battle, one can think of this as the impact on the child of a dispute 
between parents. If the costs of the dispute are borne by both parties but 
the cost o f the action that prevents the dispute are borne by just one agent, 
then there would be a tendency for too many disputes to arise. This would 
be mitigated if parties anticipated an inefficient settlement o f disputes since 
that would increase the private costs o f the dispute, and thereby increase 
the incentives for dispute prevention ex-ante. If these actions that prevent a 
dispute from arising are non verifiable, then by committing to be inefficient 
ex-post, courts increase efficiency ex-ante.
1.4 Extension: Committing Not to Trade Ex-Post
The results in the chapter have relied on the incentive-compatibility constraints 
that are restricted by trades of surplus that agents would voluntarily make 
once the allocations are assigned. Although the assumption that agents would 
exploit gains from trade ex-post is natural, it is not required for litigation to 
arise in equilibrium. This extension shows that a different assumption about 
the distribution of valuations along with the parameters of the contest function 
also creates litigation in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.5. = 1 Vy i f  v" + > 0% .
Proof. Consider a state where the surplus is allocated to agent 2. In such a 
state the transfer from agent 2 to agent 1 must satisfy the following litigation- 
proofness constraints from (1.6):
then it is not possible to have transfers that are litigation-proof. This implies 
that the surplus must always be allocated to agent 1: 6 j  = 1. Equation (1.25), 
is composed of two constraints, one for each possible agent 2 type. Using the
(1.24)
However if
(1.25)
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value functions defined in (1.20) we can check that the constraints for the state 
where agent 2 has low valuation is subsumed by the state where his valuation 
is high. That is > 6% -  v% implies -  v£. In fact this condition turns
out to be sufficient to ensure that = 1 even when we consider pooling and
semi-separating equilibria. To see this note that the corresponding constraint
for these is
v, > e i1 - v jr
Since vi + > v f  + > 6 %, condition (1.24) is sufficient to ensure 6j = 1
for all equilibria since the pooling equilibrium in subsumed in the treatment 
of semi-separating equilibrium for the case y  =
Equation (1.24) reduces to
(0\ - 6 2 ) P (x f , x%) > x f  + x%
The final constraint we get on the parameter space is
w  ch, »} -■»>-»
2 0 \  + 6**x (a9* + (1 -  a)0%A) 2 (aO* + (1 -  a)d%A) 2
□
This result proves that under certain conditions it will not be possible to 
have an allocation where the probabilities o f the surplus being transferred 
to agent 2 are positive. This is because in the event the surplus is allocated 
to agent 2, agents would find that the transfer to agent 1 does not satisfy 
litigation-proofness constraints. Therefore ex-ante agents would only contract 
on a mechanism that always allocates the surplus to agent 1. However if this 
happens, then 6 lJ = 1 and we are back in the world where proposition 1.1 
applies. This result demonstrates that the assumption that agent are capable 
of trading the surplus ex-post is not crucial for litigation to arise.
An interesting testable implication about the incidence of litigation arises 
from this assumption. Equation (1.26) is more easily satisfied when the case 
is biased in favour of one of the two parties, that is, the value of a  is close to 
zero or one. This is because equilibrium efforts are lower when a  is close 
to zero or one. The intuition for this is that when the case is biased, parties 
spend less in court because the marginal impact o f effort on the probability 
of winning is lower. This makes litigation less inefficient and consequently 
more likely.
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1.5 Applications
The existence conflict has always been a puzzle. Rational explanations of 
conflict are based on the existence of informational asymmetry between agents. 
This informational asymmetry is preserved by restricting communication 
between parties in some way. The model presented here sheds some light on 
this issue by showing that regardless of how parties communicate, conflict 
may arise when parties are limited in their ability to commit.
The argument formalised in the model is that informational asymmetry 
between agents persists when agents are unable to contract away the possibility 
of renegotiating once they reveal their information. The impossibility of 
committing not renegotiate allocations once information is revealed, affects 
the incentives for truthfully revealing information. This insight is common to 
many types of conflict other than litigation.
In this section the application o f the model to different kinds of conflict 
is discussed. The model sheds some light on the forces at work that prevent 
agents from effectively avoiding conflict. I also review some evidence that 
seems to be consistent with the predictions o f the model.
1.5.1 Patent Litigation
In this model litigation arises due to unobservability of valuations. The 
model therefore predicts that the incidence o f litigation should be negatively 
correlated with the degree of observability o f valuations. This implies that 
less litigation should be observed in sectors where disputes are about objects 
over which agents are unlikely to have private valuation.
The model predicts that litigation over intellectual property would be 
expected in industries where a firm is likely to have private information on 
how much expected profits would arise if it succeeds in securing the patent 
in court. Conversely in an industry where the profitability o f a patent is 
observable, litigation would be rare.
A related prediction regarding the incidence o f litigation is the rate of 
litigation should be positively correlated with the variance of the distribution 
of valuation. In the model we saw how litigation arises only when the two 
values 62 take are sufficiently apart. In the lim it as the variance goes to 
zero we are back in the world where valuations are observable. Depending 
on the use of the patent, firms are likely to have different valuations of the 
patent. Under the assumption that the variance of valuations increases with 
the possible uses a patent has, we should expect a positive correlation between 
the breadth of a patent and the incidence of litigation.
Lerner (1994) uses a data set where an index for the scope of a patent is 
constructed. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) studies the determinants of
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patent suits using data from US patent office, the federal courts and industry 
sources. In their data set they have measures for the market value of the 
patent. Together these data sets could be used to test the theory presented if. 
If the theory is correct, we would expect to find a positive correlation between 
the scope of a patent and the incidence of litigation even after controlling for 
things such as the market value of the patent.
1.5.2 War
Fearon (1995) argues that miscalculation of the opponent’s willingness to fight 
is one of the causes of war. While discussing the incentives of states to reveal 
their true willingness to fight he states:
“While states have an incentive to avoid the costs of war, they also wish to 
obtain a favourable resolution of the issues. This latter desire can give them 
an incentive to exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight, . . .  if  
they are concerned that revelation would make them  militarily (and hence 
politically) vulnerable... ”
The model presented here supplies the micro-foundations for this idea. 
Here the willingness to fight is determined by the valuation parties place on 
the subject m atter in dispute. A low valuation agent takes into account the 
ex-post incentive of the opponent to threaten litigation once she finds out that 
he has low valuation. This vulnerability created by truthful revelation destroys 
the incentives for truthfully declaring ones valuation.
A historical example that seems to fit the argument formalised in this model 
is the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904-05 over Korea and M anchuria. The 
primary reason for the conflict was the desire for exclusive economic control 
over Korea and Manchuria. In particular, both Russians and the Japanese had 
made significant investments in transport infrastructure in these regions. Their 
competing interest in securing exclusive control over these regions was a large 
factor in generating the conflict.
For instance, in early 1903 the Russians started lobbying in Korea for 
rights to construct a railway line between Seoul and Uiju. The Japanese were 
opposed to this since they wanted exclusive control over railway in Korea, 
being in the process of constructing a line between Seoul and Fusan. In 
Manchuria, Russia wanted exclusive control to protect the large investments in 
the Chinese-Eastern railway that was to facilitate transit o f goods from ports 
on the Pacific Ocean into Russia. Furthermore the Russians were planning to 
build a port in Dalny for getting access to sea for the Chinese-Eastern Railway. 
The Japanese who controlled the port o f Niuchuang were worried about the 
loss of trade resulting from the construction of a rival port.
There were several negotiations between the two countries in the time
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leading to the conflict. The first communication happened in 1901 in the after- 
math of the boxer rebellion which presented the Russians with an opportunity 
to increase their influence over Manchuria. In early 1901 the Russians entered 
into an agreement with China that consolidated their power in Manchuria. 
The Japanese were strongly opposed to this agreement but the Russians never 
took this opposition too seriously, believing that the Japanese would never go 
to war against a strong western power.
In late 1901 Ito Hirobumi, a Japanese minister, travelled to Russia. There 
are accounts of his negotiations with the Russians that indicate how he 
attempted to convey to the Russians the Japanese desire for exclusive control 
over Korea. The Russians however were only willing to make concessions to 
the extent o f sharing control over Korea. This position was continued in the 
final negotiations in December of 1903 when the Russians refused to accede 
to the Japanese demand for a neutral zone on the banks of the Yalu river in 
Korea. Furthermore the Russians refused to discuss the issue of M anchuria 
and maintained their stand that the Manchurian issue was not on the table.15
These accounts indicate that this instance of conflict has many of the 
ingredients that this model highlights. Both the Russians and the Japanese 
valued the control rights over Manchuria and Korea (see W hite (1964)). 
Furthermore, the Russians were unwilling to believe that Japanese sabre- 
rattling before the war was anything more than cheap talk and believed that 
Japan would be in a weak position in the event o f a war. This example 
illustrates how the incentives of parties to always overstate their willingness to 
fight creates an informational asymmetry that leads to conflict. The opponent 
disbelieves any declaration about the willingness to fight and consequently 
agents are left with no option but to fight.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to solve two longstanding problems in the literature 
on why people litigate. The first problem is microfounding the presence 
of litigation through the existence of private information in a way that is 
consistent with full discolure theorems. The model proposed here tackles this 
issue by allowing all certifiable information to be disclosed at the pre-trial 
stage. Private information that creates informational asymmetries between 
parties is purely the non-certifiable component, which is the valuation that 
parties place on the subject matter in dispute. This influences the amount spent 
in court which consequently influences the expected payoff from litigation 
thereby making it unobservable.
,5See Nish (1985) for a rich account of the negotiations between Russia and Japan preceding 
conflict.
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The second problem that this chapter tackles is the restriction that the 
literature has placed on the pre-trial interaction between parties. The literature 
so far has assumed that parties can only interact in a bargaining framework 
where they communicate through offers and counteroffers. By studying 
settlement in the framework of mechanism design, this chapter allows for 
richer communication between parties.
The main insight supplied here is that if  the possibility of committing to 
alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution is limited, then this dilutes the 
incentives for truth telling. In further work it would be interesting to develop 
a normative theory of the judiciary using this model where the possibility 
of inefficient litigation ex-post may create incentives for efficient behaviour 
ex-ante. This ties back to the conception of courts in neo classical economics 
with a slight twist: courts by their very existence deter undesirable behaviour 
that leads to disputes by ensuring that parties cannot efficiently negotiate 
themselves out of disputes once they arise.
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Chapter 2
Should Courts Enforce 
Waiver of Remedial Rights?
2.1 Introduction
Economic theory predicts that disputes between agents are off the equilibrium 
path and should therefore not happen. There are strong forces backing this 
prediction. Agents are aware that resolving a dispute takes up resources that 
often have a considerable opportunity cost. This makes agents behave in ways 
that pre-empt the creation of disputes. Hence the terms of contracts are always 
followed and property rights are never infringed.
However in the real world disputes between economic agents arise with 
an alarming frequency. This seems to be inefficient since scarce resources 
are diverted away from productive activities into dispute resolution. This is 
especially the case when disputes end up in court. In the previous chapter 
of this thesis I have argued that disputes are litigated when parties lack the 
ability to contract away their right to litigate at the pre-trial stage. Given 
that disputes are costly and litigating them is even costlier, the question that 
naturally arises here is why don’t courts enforce such contracts when doing 
so would reduce the costs of resolving a dispute once it arises? This chapter 
attempts to answer this question.
The first ingredient in the argument presented here is that disputes are 
inefficient because an agent only takes into account her own costs of resolving 
the dispute and not the costs that her opponent would have to bear. This leads 
to too many disputes. Secondly, the agent who started the dispute cannot be 
identified since courts are constrained in their ability to observe what actually 
happened in the past. Thirdly a dispute is typically unobservable unless it ends 
up in court. Building on these elements, the model presented here shows that
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a benevolent social planner may choose not to enforce the waiver of remedial 
rights to increase ex-ante welfare. This result arises because ensuring that 
disputes end up in court makes agents internalise the costs o f a dispute and 
this avoids the creation of disputes in the first place. Once a dispute arises it 
would be optimal for courts to never step in since they are costly. However 
the real possibility of costly courts, created by the non enforcement of waiver, 
raises ex-ante welfare by ensuring that some fraction of disputes don’t arise 
to start with.
This chapter is related to the literature on optimal incidence of litigation. 
This literature seeks to uncover mechanisms that determine the efficient level 
of litigation in society. Shavell (1997), one of the first papers in this literature, 
pointed out that the amount o f litigation may not equal the efficient amount. 
In that paper litigation can exceed the efficient level since parties do not take 
into account their opponent’s cost from litigation. This can lead to too much 
litigation. Similarly parties fail to take into account the social benefits such 
as the value of the precedent created through litigation, and the social costs 
of litigation such as the cost of maintaining a judicial system. Again these 
factors can drive a wedge between the observed level and the efficient level of 
litigation.
Another paper in this literature on the question of social costs and benefits 
of litigation that are not internalised by parties is Hua and Spier (2005). The 
authors argue that the information revealed during trial about the liability of 
the defendant has positive externalities on potential defendants in the future 
since they can fine tune their level of care based on the information revealed 
during the trial. Since parties only care about their private benefits and costs, 
they do not internalise this effect.
It is well understood that when parties interact in an environment of 
asymmetric information inefficiencies arise. However it is unclear whether 
that generates the role for an interventionist court when the court does not 
have access to private information of the parties. This chapter is related to a 
small literature that explores this issue. The paper by Anderlini et al. (2006b) 
shows that courts can increase ex-ante welfare by voiding some contracts. 
In their paper parties contract under asymmetric information and inefficient 
pooling equilibria can obtain. When courts void certain kinds of contracts 
with positive probability, the pooling equilibria are weeded out and parties 
are forced to separate. This result is generalised further in Anderlini et al. 
(2006a). These papers make the general point that there is a role for an 
interventionist court when parties contract in an environment of asymmetric 
information. The mechanism that generates the result their paper is different 
than this chapter. In Anderlini et al. (2006b), what generates the inefficiency 
is the fact that courts maximise ex-ante surplus but parties only contract at
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the interim stage where their own type is already known to them. In contrast 
what is emphasised here is the externality that is imposed on the opponent 
when an agent decides to raise a dispute.
The following is the outline for the chapter. Firstly the model o f how 
disputes arise is presented in section 2.2. The equilibrium of the game between 
the two agents is presented in section 2.3, and it is shown how this equilibrium 
varies with enforcement and non enforcement o f waivers. In section 2.4 the 
efficiency properties o f the equilibrium presented in 2.3 are analysed. The 
main results are presented in section 2.5. In section 2.6 the role of various 
informational assumptions is discussed. In this section the different types of 
inefficiencies that arise in this model are also discussed. Finally section 2.7 
concludes.
2.2 Model
The setup is similar to the previous chapter o f this thesis. The innovation is 
that the arrival of a dispute is no longer exogenous. Instead a dispute arises if 
at least one party starts it. The dispute is over a surplus that agent 1 values at 
01 and agent 2 values at 6% with probability q and 0£ with probability (1 -  q). 
Agent 2’s valuation is only known to him.
Initially the surplus is either with agent 1 with probability ( 1 - 0 )  and 
agent 2 with probability 0. The initial allocation o f possession implies that 
in the case the dispute does not arise, the agent with the initial possession 
continues to enjoy the surplus. The property rights over this surplus are 
fuzzy. This simply means that if the dispute goes to court, there is a non-zero 
probability that either of the two parties will win. Therefore if  a dispute arises 
between the two agents, they will negotiate over the allocation of the surplus 
in exchange of some transfers. Just like the previous chapter of this thesis, 
the payoff from litigation is the outside option to negotiations.
An agent chooses between the status quo allocation or starting a dispute. 
The private cost of the dispute to an agent is c that is either c11 or c1 with 
probability 6 and (1 -  6). If  a dispute is successfully negotiated, one party 
is allocated the surplus in exchange for a transfer to the other party. An 
unsuccessful negotiation leads to the dispute going to court.
Timeline:
Stage 1: The status quo allocation of surplus is decided.
Stage 2: Agents realise c\ and and non-cooperatively decide whether to begin 
a dispute.
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Stage 3: If dispute arises, parties start pre-trial negotiation which is a game that 
may help them avoid taking the matter to court.
S tage 4: Parties play the game from stage 2 and receive the equilibrium allocation.
Stage 5: Parties non-cooperatively choose between the equilibrium allocation 
from stage 2 and approaching the court.
S tage 6: I f  either agent has approached the court, then both non co-operatively 
choose their effort levels.
S tage 7: Court makes a  final decision on the allocation of the surplus.
This model applies to all the disputes that are mentioned in the previous 
chapter. At this point it is useful to sketch a particular example to fix ideas. 
Consider a case where there are two firms; firm 1 and firm 2. Firm  1 owns 
an intellectual property right over widget 1. Firm 2 begins production widget 
2 which is similar to  widget 1. It is unclear whether the two widgets are 
sufficiently similar for the production of widget 2 to be a violation of the 
property right of firm 1. In response to firm 2’s production o f widget 2, firm 
1 has two options. It can either choose to do nothing or it can choose to send 
a notice to firm 2 about the potential violation o f firm l ’s right. If it chooses 
the latter course, and firm 2 is unwilling to stop production o f widget 2, then 
a dispute arises between the two firms.
2.2.1 Litigation
Just like the previous chapter of this thesis, litigation is modeled as a contest 
between the two agents. Following are the objective functions of the two 
agents.
that henceforth j  refers to the type of agent 2. It is assumed that the probability 
of winning is increasing in ones own effort and decreasing in the effort of the 
opponent.
If  the valuation of agent 2 was observable, then this would be a game of 
complete information where we could compute the Nash equilibrium effort 
levels o f the agents. Here, since his valuation is private information, agent 1 
instead plays a Bayesian game where the optimal effort level of agent 1 is:
0i P(jci , x2) -  *i and 0^( 1 -  P (* i, x 2)) -  x 2 j  e  {L, H }
where 0i is the valuation of agent 1 and 0^ is the valuation of agent 2. Note
xi (0i) = argmax 0i V  qj P (* i, x 2(Qi1))
Xl- 0 I  j€{H,L)
(2 . 1)
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Similarly the optimal effort level of type j  agent 2 is
x2(ftj) = argmax 6^ P  (*i (d\ ), x2) -  x 2. (2.2)
X2>Q
Having computed the Bayesian Nash equilibrium effort levels for agent 1 and 
2, we can work out the expected payoff from litigation for the agents. These 
are
v2( ^ )  = OJ2q J p (x l (e]l x 2(.0J2)) -  x 2(6{) j  e  {H ,L }. (2.4)
2.2.2 Negotiations
Once disputes arise agents are inclined to resolve them as efficiently as possible. 
To this end parties would negotiate. It is impossible to predict what game 
form the negotiation takes. Agents could bargain over the surplus. Such 
bargaining may be stretched out over multiple periods or one of the two agents 
may have the bargaining power enabling her to make a take it or leave it offer 
to her opponent. Moreover, in addition to bargaining, there may be cheap 
talk involved with agents making threats o f dubious credibility. Rather than 
imposing a game form on the negotiations, I use a mechanism design approach 
where equilibrium allocations of any game parties play can be replicated using 
a direct mechanism. This insight is known as the revelation principle.
The success or failure of negotiations depends on whether courts enforce 
waiver. This section analyses the outcome of negotiations in the two cases 
of enforcement and non enforcement o f waiver. The direct mechanism that 
captures the equilibrium of negotiations is composed of probability of being 
allocated the surplus and the corresponding transfer that the agent makes. Let 
fij be the probability with which the surplus is allocated to agent i o f type 
j  and tj be the corresponding transfer that the agent makes to her opponent 
when she is allocated the surplus.
Negotiations with Waiver
If agents are allowed to commit not to litigate, they will do so as long as their 
expected payoff from negotiations is greater than the expected payoff from  
litigation. Let the expected payoffs from  negotiations be /q (0 i), /i2(# f) and 
fi2(0%). For negotiations to be successful it must be the case that
(2.3)
and
V i,; i € {1,2} ;€ (4> ,H ,L } .
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In words this simply means that negotiations will be successful if the expected 
payoff for both agents is from negotiation is greater than the expected payoff 
from litigation. In proposition 1.4 it was shown that as long as agents 
can com mit not to litigate, such piiPj) always exist. This implies that the 
participation constraint for agents to choose negotiations would always be 
satisfied.
The exact allocation that comes about as a result of negotiations depends 
on the relative bargaining power, or more precisely negotiation power, o f the 
two agents. However it is possible to characterize the most efficient allocation 
that can arise as an equilibrium through negotiations. The logic o f focusing 
attention on the most efficient equilibrium allocation is explained in section 
2.4.1.
Note that the most efficient allocation is one where the surplus is allocated 
to agent 1 in return for some transfer to agent 2. However this allocation 
cannot be an equilibrium in the space of parameter values captured in the 
previous chapter. Recall that is the probability with which the direct 
mechanism allocates the surplus to a high type agent 2. The equilibrium 
allocation must satisfy P^ > 0. This is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.1. ^  > 0 in any negotiation equilibrium when proposition 1.2 
holds.
Proof. Firstly note that a pooling equilibrium cannot exists when proposition 
1.2 holds. Hence we can focus on a separating equilibrium. Since 0% > /?£, 
and we want to show that 0% > we can set ~  0 to find the lower bound of 
P j.  For separation to be possible IC constraints for agent 2 must be satisfied. 
These reduce to
W («i) = (<7(1 - $ )  + (1 -  ?))» i +
Furthermore, these must satisfy the participation constraints
p fd j)  > v fe j)  V i J  i g{1 ,2)
for agents to prefer negotiations over litigation. If  0% = 0 then the transfer 
made to agent 2 -t%  = V2(0^). However as proposition 1.2 shows, vi(#i) > 
6\ -  V2(0^). Hence if  = 0  then the participation constraint of agent 1 
cannot be satisfied. □
If surplus is always allocated to agent 1, then the transfer to agent 2 
must be independent o f his declaration. However as this is not possible 
since the transfer that then needs to be made by agent 1 to agent 2 is too
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large for agent 1 to consent to negotiations. Hence some inefficiency, in the 
form of the surplus being allocated to agent 2, m ust ensue. This implies 
t*\(Qi) + qH 1*2 (6 %)+ qLfi(d%) < 6 \, that there is some loss of efficiency inherent 
in the negotiation process.
Negotiations without Waiver
As shown in the previous chapter of this thesis, when waivers are not enforced 
by courts, negotiations break down. This is because agents anticipate that the 
statements of their opponents are not credible. In the case where waivers are 
enforced, the participation constraint is an ex ante constraint. This means that 
agents choose negotiations as long as the expected payoff from negotiations is 
larger than litigation before the type of the opponent is revealed. Now however, 
the constraint also becomes an ex post constraint. Agent should prefer his 
payoff to the litigation payoff for any declaration of agent 2 type. Since this is 
a much stronger requirement, pre-trial negotiations break down and litigation 
occurs.
2.2.3 Dispute
This section models the decision of an agent to start a dispute. A  dispute 
arises when two agents find themselves in a situation where both are laying 
claim on the same surplus.
In the status quo agent 2 is endowed with the surplus with probability 0 
and agent 1 with probability (1 -  (f>). Once the surplus is allocated, agents 
realise their costs o f starting a dispute. W ith probability 8  the costs are ch  
and with probability (1 -  6) the costs are cL with c# > cl- The costs o f the 
two agents are independently drawn.1 Whenever the surplus is allocated to an 
agent it is assumed that her opponent prefers to start a dispute as long as the 
dispute yields the negotiation payoff. Mathematically this implies
l* i(e j) -c k > 0 V i, j ,k  i e  {1,2} j e { 0 , L , H )  k e { L , H ) .
(2.5)
Given this assumption, a dispute always arises whenever waivers are enforced. 
This is because the payoff from  a successful negotiation is assumed to be 
higher than the costs of the dispute for the agent that is not endowed with the 
surplus. Agent i o f type j  knows that pre-trial negotiations will be successful 
and will result in the negotiation payoff //,(#/). On the other hand when instead 
the agent faces the prospect of costly litigation, the a dispossessed agent wants
’The results are qualitatively similar when costs o f  the two agents are correlated. The results 
are strengthened (weakened) when the correlation between the costs is positive (negative).
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to start a dispute only when the cost is low. This assumption implies
v«(0/) -  cL > 0 > v,(0/) -  cH Vi, j  i G {1,2} ;  e  {<D, L, H).  (2.6)
2.3 Equilibrium
It is now possible to characterise the equilibrium of this game.
Lem m a 2.2. When waivers are enforced, disputes always arise. When waivers 
are not enforced, disputes only arise when the costs o f  the dispossessed agent 
are low.
Proof. Follows trivially from (2.5) and (2.6). □
Given the assumption on costs of the agents it directly follows that in 
the full waiver regime disputes always arise. This is because the negotiation 
payoff Pi(Of) is always larger than the costs for the dispossessed agent. On 
the other hand, if waivers are not enforced, disputes only arise when the costs 
of the dispossessed agent are low. This happens because the agent anticipates 
that once disputes arise they are resolved in a court and courts are costly.
2.4 Social Surplus
The equilibrium of the game between agents was described in the previous 
section. In this section the welfare properties of that equilibrium are analysed. 
The analysis will be limited to evaluation of the total surplus under the two 
possible court policies, that is, when waivers are enforced and when they are 
not. Note that the surplus will be computed from an ex-ante stage where the 
costs of the agents are yet to be realised. This is the correct position from 
which to calculate the total surplus if the welfare consequences of the waiver 
policy on incidence of disputes is to be evaluated.
2.4.1 Full Waiver
W hen courts enforce waivers, disputes arise regardless o f the costs of the 
agents. Hence the expected total surplus is
Mi (0i) + qHM2(6%) + tfV(02) “  2 E(c) (2.7)
From lemma 2.1 we know that the expected surplus from negotiations is less 
than 0 i. Hence we can rewrite equation (2.7) as
(1 -  t )0] -  2 E ( c )  where 0 < r  < 1.
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Assume that the surplus when disputes don’t arise is greater than the surplus 
when disputes arise. This implies
<f> E(02) + (1 -  <f>)91 > (1 -  t )0i -  2 E(c) (2.8)
At this point, a clarification for the use o f the m ost efficient negotiation 
equilibrium is required. W hat is assumed here is that even the best possible 
negotiation allocations are inferior to status quo since agents do not internalise 
the costs of the dispute that are incurred by their opponents. It is well under­
stood that with complete information bargaining leads to efficient allocations 
regardless of how relative bargaining power is distributed between the agents. 
In an environment of incomplete information however, the level of inefficiency 
may depend on the particular game form and consequently on the bargaining 
power of agents.2 Hence it is possible that the actual equilibrium that ensues 
as a result of negotiations is less efficient. However the argument that is made 
in this chapter is that since negotiations may be too efficient, agents may raise 
too many disputes and this is undesirable. If  negotiations are inefficient in 
themselves then this automatically dampens the private incentives to create 
disputes thereby reducing the number of disputes. In such cases the policy of 
not enforcing waivers will have no effect since negotiations themselves would 
be inefficient enough to deter disputes. However non enforcement o f waivers 
will make a difference if  the equilibrium that arises through negotiations is 
‘too efficient’.
2.4.2 No Waiver
W hen waivers are not enforced by courts, disputes only arise when costs of 
the dispossessed agent are low. This is shown in lemma 2.2. This implies that 
the expected surplus without waivers is
6 (0E(02) + (1 -  m )  + (1 -  tf) (v ,(0i) + E(v2( ^ ) )  -  cL -  E(c))
W ith probability 6 the dispossessed agent has high costs. W hen this 
happens no dispute arises and we get the first part of the expressions. On the 
other hand, if  the agent has low costs, a dispute arises and we get the second 
part o f the expression. This happens with probability (1 - 6 ) .
2.5 Result
If the court acts as a social planner that maximises ex-ante social surplus, we 
have the following proposition.
2See Ausubel et al. (2002) for discussion o f  this issue and a survey o f  the related literature.
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Proposition 2.1. There always exists a 8* < 1 such that fo r  a 8 > 8*, it is 
optimal fo r  court not to enforce the waiver o f  remedial rights.
Proof Given the assumption in equation 2.8, the surplus is always higher 
when disputes don’t arise. Recall that the dispossessed agent only raises a 
dispute when costs are low when waivers are not enforced. Hence there exists 
a 8* such that
s’ +(i - m )+a - <n (^ i)+ems')) - cL - m )
= ( l - r ) 0 i - 2 E ( c ) .
And for any 8 > 8*, the first expression must be strictly larger. □
The intuition for this result is as follows. Surplus is always greater 
when disputes don’t arise. The enforcement of waiver maximises the surplus 
conditional on disputes arising. W hen waivers are not enforced, agents are 
faced with costly litgation. The threat o f costly litigation however implies that 
disputes, under the non enforcement o f waiver, only arise if costs are low. 
Recall that 8 is the probability with which an agent has high costs. Hence 
when 8 is high, disputes arise less frequently.
The optimal policy that would replicate the first best would be if  courts 
could set a fine that makes the agent that starts the dispute internalise the 
externality she imposes on her opponent. This however is not possible for 
two reasons. Firstly the agent who bears the responsibility for starting a 
dispute cannot be identified. Secondly it is not possible for courts to police 
all disputes. Courts are limited in the exercise o f their judgm ent to the 
proportion of disputes that actually end up in court. The presence of these 
handicaps create a second best world where courts find it optimal to use the 
non-enforcement of waiver of remedial rights as a way to optimise the number 
of disputes that arise and hence to maximise social surplus.
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Figure 2.1: Social Planner’s Problem
Dispi > Dispute
Litigate Settle
vi (fit) + E(v2( ^ ) )  - c l -  E ( c ) (1 -  t)0 i -  2 E(c)
Figure 2.5 shows what the problem looks like from the point o f view of 
a social planner. It is not the extensive form  of the game. The moves in 
the figure cannot be directly controlled by the planner. The social planner 
can influence vi and V2 by choosing A to affect the equilibrium effort level. 
I f  the effort levels are high, then litigation is inefficient. Furtherm ore the 
social planner in the form of a court can choose not to enforce contracts 
where agents have waived their right to litigate. It will be shown in the results 
that by doing so courts, under certain conditions, rule out the possibility of 
successful negotiations. Since parties anticipate ex-ante that a dispute will 
not be effectively negotiated and is therefore likely to end up in court, they 
prefer to avoid actions that would create a dispute. This leads to an increased 
social surplus ex-ante.
The primary implication of non-enforcement of waiver is to strengthen 
the position of the agent that is endowed with the surplus is status quo. Since 
dispute resolution is made costly as a result of this policy, the opponent’s 
incentive to create a dispute is dampened. In this model it is assumed that this 
is always a good thing since the total costs of the dispute outweigh the benefits 
of the dispute that arise through the potential reallocation o f the surplus to 
the party with the higher valuation.
In addition to the ingredients o f the previous result if  we assume further
that
then the following proposition emerges
Proposition 2.2. There exists c*L such that fo r  q , < c*L, keeping E(c) constant, 
non enforcement o f  waiver maximises total surplus.
Proof. When waivers are not enforced, disputes only arise when costs o f the
v i(0 i)+ e(v2(^2)) -  e (c ) > ^ e  m  + ( i -  m (2.9)
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dispossessed agent are low. Hence the surplus is
vjP O  + ECvjC ^ H - c l -E C c).
There must exist a c*L such that the two sides o f equation (2.9) are equalised, 
and below which non enforcement of waiver dominates. □
Unlike proposition 2.1, this proposition demonstrates the trade-off between 
the two types of inefficiencies in the model. In the status quo the surplus 
may be inefficiently allocated to the agent with the lower valuation (<f> is 
high). Hence it may be optimal to allow some disputes. However there is an 
inefficiency to disputes in form of costs that are not internalised by agents. 
This inefficiency dominates when the costs are high. Hence it is socially 
optimal to allow disputes when the costs of one of the agents is low. The non 
enforcement o f waiver allows the courts to exactly implement this outcome. 
By making dispute resolution inefficient enough, courts ensure that disputes 
only arise when the costs to the dispossessed agent are low.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Role of Informational Environment
In this section I discuss the role that the informational environment plays in 
generating this result.
The Identity of the Agent that Started the Dispute is Non-Verifiable
This assumption is needed because if  the social planner could observe the 
identity of the agent who begins the dispute, then she could simply tax that 
party. This would be the efficient way of stopping disputes from arising and 
waivers would no longer be needed. The example o f the two firms engaged 
in a dispute over intellectual property rights clarifies how both the agents 
could be responsible for starting the dispute. Firm 1 can stop the dispute from 
arising by deciding to allow the firm 2 to continue its production of widget 2. 
Similarly firm 2 can voluntarily stop the production of widget 2 and thereby 
avoid the dispute. Any other interaction between the 2 firms, such as transfer 
from firm 1 to firm 2 for stopping the production of widget 2, is ruled out 
here till stage 3 commences. It is only in stage 3 that the two firms can come 
together and negotiate. However at this stage the dispute costs are already 
sunk since coming to the negotiation table is costly for both firms.
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Incompleteness in the Law
It should be noted that the act of starting the dispute may be completely 
independent o f the legal position in the case. Dispute can only arise when 
precise predictions about the outcome of the case cannot be made. Going back 
to the example, if the intellectual property rights were clearly defined, say in 
favour of firm 1, then firm 2 would know any dispute that arises would be 
settled in favour of party 1. This would deter disputes. It is the incompleteness 
in the law that causes disputes to go to court. It is natural however to assume 
that the law is incomplete. Firstly is impossible for law makers to envisage 
all possible disputes that can arise. Furtherm ore the existence o f a law that 
completely specifies the allocation of surplus in every conceivable state seems 
implausible since the state space can be extremely rich. A nd lastly, even if 
such a complete law could be written, it would be of limited use unless courts 
could verify the true state to implement the corresponding allocation.
2.6.2 Inefficiencies
The inefficiencies generated by the model can be classified in four groups. In 
this section I discuss how these arise, why they are a necessary ingredient for 
the result, and how they can be mapped to inefficiencies that we observe in 
the real world.
Inefficient Status Quo Allocation of the Surplus
The initial allocation of the surplus is made to agent 2 with probability 0  and 
agent 1 with probability ( 1 - 0 ) .  Since 0  > 1 there is an inefficiency in the 
initial allocation since the surplus stays with agent 2 with some probability 
even though agent 1 always values it more. Inefficiencies o f this sort seem 
quite common place in reality unless one believes that existing allocations are 
pareto efficient.
Externality of the Costs of Dispute
The main inefficiency that drives the result in this model is fact that agents 
do not take into account their opponents costs when they decide to start a 
dispute. This implies that when a dispute begins there is an externality on 
the opponent. The costs that are envisaged here are the costs of meeting the 
opponent. The managers of the two firms that engage in a dispute need to 
take time out of productive activities and devote it to set up meeting with 
each other. In addition to the tim e of the managers, the firms also need to 
divert resources away from productive activities into dispute resolution. Firms 
typically set up in house specialists that deal with dispute resolution such as a
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legal department. To the extent that the expenditure on these is proportional 
to the number of disputes that are expected to arise in the future, these can 
all add up to costs that are externalities imposed by one firm on another.
Inefficiencies in Negotiation
As noted in lemma 2.1, there is an inefficiency in negotiations. This arises 
because in any equilibrium that arises in negotiations, m ust entail a non 
zero probability with which the surplus goes to a high type agent 2. This 
is inefficient since agent 1 always has higher valuation of the surplus. This 
inefficiency is not a necessary ingredient for the result o f this model to arise 
but nonetheless, it emerges as a feature of any pre-trial negotiation.
Litigation Costs
The costs of litigation arise as a result of the contest like nature of litigation 
and as such is a general feature of all contests. This inefficiency plays a crucial 
role in generating the result. It is the threat o f costly litigation, generated 
by the non-enforcement o f waiver, that deters disputes from  arising.3 This 
inefficiency is traded off with the inefficiency of the costs of the dispute and 
consequently agents are made to partly internalise the effect o f their decision 
to start a dispute on their opponent.
2.7 Conclusion
The story that is captured here is very simple. Once disputes arise, it is always 
efficient to allow parties to settle as efficiently as possible. This happens when 
courts enforce waiver of remedial rights. However disputes are costly over and 
above the cost of litigation. W hen parties decide to raise a dispute they do 
not internalise the costs of dispute that their opponents have to bear. Hence if 
waivers are not enforced, then the anticipation of costly dispute resolution can 
increase the surplus as this deters some disputes from arising.
3In addition to the waiver policy, the social planner decides on the elasticity o f  the contest 
function with respect to effort to optimize how much inefficiency is generated in equilibrium in 
litigation. She can do so by varying the value o f  A. This has been left unmodeled.
Chapter 3
Can Market Failure Cause 
Political Failure?
3.1 Introduction
It is well known that market failures abound in the real world. A key insight 
in the institutional approach to development economics is that capital market 
failures prevent individuals and economies from reaching their full potential 
and can lead to poverty traps (see Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and 
Zeira (1993)). In this literature institutional frictions are taken as exogenous.1
It is also well known that even fully accountable governments can fail to 
implement growth maximising policies when they lack sufficient instruments 
for compensating losers. Furthermore, the political economy approach to 
development has emphasized how concentration of political power in the 
hands o f an elite, may lead to distortion o f the market by the elites for 
maximising their own payoffs.2 This strand within the political economy 
literature makes the argument that the distribution of political power may be 
sufficiently skewed so as to allow the elites to distort the market outcome in 
their favour, and this typically leads to inefficiencies.
In this chapter we highlight the reverse link, namely that market failure 
may create a political failure even when political power is uniformly dis­
tributed. We think of political failure as the failure o f the electorate to pick 
the surplus maximising reform.3 In our model, in the first best world with 
well functioning markets, the electorate unanimously chooses institutions that 
maximise total surplus. However once a market imperfection in the form of
'See Baneijee (2001) for a survey o f  this literature.
2This is most obvious when elites lobby for barriers to entry (Djankov et al. (2002)). Acemoglu 
(2003) makes the argument that concentration o f  political power may lead to distortion o f  the 
market through manipulation o f factor prices in ways that benefit the political elites.
3For a discussion on somewhat different notions o f political failure see Besley (2006).
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unobservability of entrepreneurial talent is introduced, things change dramat­
ically. The competitive market responds to this imperfection by screening 
agents based on their wealth. This leads to creation o f a class structure in 
the economy with preferences that are aligned in ways that defeat surplus 
maximising reforms. In a nutshell, the motivation for this chapter is to uncover 
the political implications of market failure.
There is an important distinction between our approach and the existing 
literature on political economy. Instead of taking political classes or interest 
groups as exogenous and studying the impact of their alignment on markets, 
we derive them from economic fundamentals, namely, the nature of technol­
ogy, and the informational environment in the economy. In this regard, the 
mechanism that our chapter identifies fits into a theme present in both Marxist 
and Neo-Classical theories of institutions that use economic forces as the base 
over which the political superstructure is built.4
We argue that in addition to the well known impact o f market failure 
articulated in the literature on poverty traps, there may also be a political 
impact. The latter problem could turn out to be more persistent since unlike 
the solutions to poverty traps that are easier to characterise5, the solutions 
to political failure that are politically feasible may not exist. A more gen­
eral message emerging from  our model is that market and political failures 
complement each other in terms of generating economic inefficiencies.
This chapter is related to the growing literature on micro political economy. 
This literature looks at failure of alternative institutions and asks two questions:
1. Which institutions make an economy more productive?
2. Which institutions are more likely to be chosen given a certain distribu­
tion of political power?
We now present a review of papers that ask similar questions. Boyer 
and Laffont (1999) present a model where a monopolist produces a socially 
valuable good and some am ount of pollution as a byproduct. The regulator 
has a choice of several instruments that can be used to make transfers to the 
monopolist. The incentives of the electorate may not be aligned with those 
of a total surplus maximising regulator since the electorate is composed of 
voters o f whom a certain proportion are also shareholders in the monopoly. 
This can lead to non surplus maximising policies being chosen, regardless of 
information asymmetries.
Perotti and Volpin (2004) have a model where agents are endowed with 
wealth and are either consumers or entrepreneurs. There is a non convexity in 
the production function and entrepreneurs with wealth lower than a certain
4See chapter 1 in Bardhan (1989) for a review o f  the common themes in these literatures 
concerning the theory o f  institutions.
5Micro-lending has been a big theme in this literature. See for example Ghatak and Guinnane 
(1999).
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threshold are financed by equity. Project returns are subject to the ex post 
moral hazard problem and investor protection, the institution that they study, 
can mitigate the problem. Elites that have wealth over the threshold required 
to start an enterprise, lobby for lower investor protection so as to face a lower 
competition in the product market. The political economy process is modelled 
as a social planner that maxmises the weighted sum of the total surplus and 
bribes from lobbies. As the weight on the bribes increases, investor protection 
goes down.
Rajan and Zingales (2006) study a model evaluating the incentives of the 
educated and non-educated class to pass educational and pro market reform. 
Educational reforms allow the uneducated to become educated and increase 
their wages through an increase in their productivity. Pro market reforms 
allow educated workers to setup their own firms. An agent’s preference for 
any reform is driven by which group the agent belongs to.
Biais and Mariotti (2003) address the question of optimal bankruptcy laws. 
They have a model of occupational choice where agents can be entrepreneurs 
or workers. Credit market is imperfect because entrepreneurial effort is 
unobservable. The mechanism through which bankruptcy law affects total 
surplus is the following: a tough bankruptcy law implies a strong threat of 
liquidation ex-ante. This induces high effort which increases surplus. However 
liquidation is ex-post inefficient since some surplus is lost when a company 
is harvested for its assets at liquidation. In terms o f the political economy 
aspects, the rich want soft laws to induce lower wages. The poor want the 
opposite. The agents w ith intermediate wealth align with rich if they are 
entrepreneurs and align with poor otherwise. This paper is similar to ours 
in the sense that here too a market failure generates the need for institutions. 
The paper differs from  this chapter in terms of the result they find on the 
choices an electorate make. In their model soft laws which are often chosen 
by the electorate are often efficient due to inefficiency of liquidation ex post. 
In contrast, our results indicate that their exists an inherent tension between 
politically feasible and surplus maximising reforms.
Another paper that is related to this chapter is Caselli and Gennaioli (2008). 
In their model agents differ in two discrete dimensions; talent and license. 
There is an exogenous mismatch between talent to run an enterprise and the 
endowment of license that is required to run an enterprise. They model how 
this exogenously conferred incumbency and talent interact to create preferences 
for deregulation and legal reform. Deregulation lowers the cost of acquiring a 
new license whereas legal reform makes the trade of licenses between agents 
easier.
In these models, markets can be complete and perfectly competitive if the 
best possible institutions are chosen. In absence of such institutions, frictions
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are created that take the economy away from the growth maximising outcome. 
The source of problems in these models is purely the exogenous presence of 
political alignments that undermine the support for best possible institutions. 
In our model on the other hand these political alignments are endogenised and 
the fundamental source of inefficiency will be the adverse selection problem 
created by the unobservability of entrepreneurial talent. Institutions, depending 
on their quality, would mitigate or worsen this problem.
In our model, even with fully benevolent government and perfectly com­
petitive markets, there are market frictions arising from  informational (i.e., 
adverse selection) and transactional constraints (limited liability). As in the 
standard neoclassical model, preference and technology differences might 
have seemingly similar implications: e.g., in the Solow model, low steady 
state output could result from lower saving propensity or use of less efficient 
technology. However, the policy implications are dramatically different: pref­
erence differences are more intractable than technology differences and this is 
especially so if we recognize the potential mutual interaction of preferences 
and technology adoption which, for example, reflects some underlying market 
failure. Analogously, we argue that with government frictions the policy 
implications are to be found in the political domain and are relatively easy 
to characterize which is not to say they are easy to implement: improve 
political institutions to improve the quality o f candidates, improve incentives 
for incumbents so that inefficient rent-extracting policies are removed. In 
contrast, with market frictions the policies are far less easy to characterize, 
and this is especially so if they interact with an otherwise frictionless political 
system where the distribution of political power is uniform.
3.2 Model
The basic setup extends the model presented in Ghatak et al. (2007).
3.2.1 Technology
There are two technologies in the economy: a subsistence technology that 
yields w with certainty for one unit of labour and a more productive technology 
y  that yields a return R  in case of success and 0 in case of failure and requires 
n workers and 1 entrepreneur to run it.
3.2.2 Preferences
All agents are assumed to be risk neutral with a utility function that is additively 
separable in effort and money. The net disutility o f labour effort relative to 
entrepreneurial effort is normalised to M. This can also include any perks that
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entrepreneurs enjoy relative to workers such as the comfort o f sitting in an air 
conditioned office, or the psychological payoff from not having a boss.
3.2.3 Endowments
Agents are endowed with one unit of labour, entrepreneurial talent and illiquid 
wealth. Talent 6 of an agent is the probability of success of the more productive 
technology if  she becomes an entrepreneur. 6 is distributed with a cdf F(6). 
Agents are endowed with illiquid wealth a with a distribution G(a). We assume 
that the distributions of wealth and talent are independent.
3.2.4 Informational and Institutional Frictions
The entrepreneurial ability 6 can be either observable or unobservable. In 
the first best world 6 is observable and the first welfare theorem operates 
ensuring that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. In contrast when 
6 is unobservable, a market failure arises. The illiquid wealth a, and output 
y, are verifiable. M  is also verifiable but is not appropriable since it is the 
psychological net benefit o f being an entrepreneur.
The 2 institutional parameters in the model are <f> and r .  <f> is the proportion 
of collateral that is recovered from a borrower when she defaults. This can 
be thought o f as the strength of judicial enforcement o f contracts, r  is the 
probability with which the wealth a is expropriated. The efficiency of both 
these institutions affect the credit contract that an agent is offered in the second 
best world as the credit market takes into account the efficiency of the judiciary 
and the risk of expropriation when accepting the agent’s wealth as collateral. 
We discuss this in greater detail in section 3.5.
In addition to these institutional variables, a limited liability constraint 
also operates in the economy. This implies that in the event an entrepreneurial 
project fails, the agent can only be liable upto the illiquid asset a. In other 
words agents are guaranteed a non negative payoff in all states of the world.
3.2.5 Occupational Choice
Agents choose their occupation. They can either choose to work in the 
subsistence sector, become workers, or become entrepreneurs. They are paid 
a wage w at the end o f the period if  they choose to work for a wage. If  they 
choose entrepreneurship, their payoff is stochastic. The project succeeds with 
a probability 6 which is the unobservable talent of the agent. To set up a 
firm an entrepreneur needs to hire n workers and pay them a wage w up front. 
Where w > w  since working with the subsistence technology is an outside 
option that all agents have.
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Our assumption that the productive technology requires n workers and 1 
entrepreneur implies that workers and the entrepreneur are perfect complements 
in the production function. This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis 
and allows us to get sharp political economy results, though is not central to 
our analysis.
3.2.6 Markets
We will present a general equilibrium model with two markets; the labour 
and credit market. The need for credit arises as workers need to be paid up 
front when an entrepreneurial project is set up and the wealth o f agents is 
illiquid. Both the markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The risk 
free interest rate is assumed to be zero.
3.3 Credit Contracts
Since the wealth of an agent is illiquid, agents need to borrow from the credit 
market to become entrepreneurs. The credit market is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive. The supply of credit is assumed to be perfectly elastic at interest 
rate equal to 1.
3.3.1 First Best
If talent was observable, then credit contract would not be based on collateral 
due to the presence of contractual friction 0 that arises when collateral is used. 
Hence an agent with talent 6 would be offered a contract with an interest rate 
i .  Since the mass of entrepreneurs in this economy cannot exceed in 
equilibrium the wage would ensure that agents with talent less than 6* become 
workers where
l
<r-. ff(g)de = -^ T.
J  n + 1
0*
For the labour market to be in equilibrium, an agent with talent lower than 6* 
should prefer working for a wage and agents with greater talent should prefer 
entrepreneurship. This implies that in equilibrium the agent with talent 8*, 
who is indifferent between working for a wage and becoming an entrepreneur, 
has the following occupational choice condition:
(
nw\
R — —  I + M  + (1 -  r )a  = w  + (1 — r)a.
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We can rearrange this condition to back out the equilibrium wage w at which 
the labour market clears:
-  d *R  +  M  n uw = ----— . (3.1)
n + 1
It follows that in the first best world the value of <p will not matter since 
wealth will not be used in the credit contract. In contrast, the value of r  would
matter since an increase in t  would lower the expected payoff of agents due
to the increased risk of expropriation.
We assume that
w >  M > w .
The first part of the assumption ensures that the returns from the project when 
it succeeds are large enough to make interest payments.6
The second part of the assumption, M  > w is necessary for the existence 
of a credit constraint in this economy.7
3.3.2 Second Best
The second best world is characterised by the unobservability of entrepreneurial 
talent. In all other respects it is identical to the first best world. Since talent is 
unobservable, the credit market can no longer offer contracts that are indexed 
by the agent’s talent. However agents are endowed with wealth which they 
can use as collateral to access credit. Hence the credit contract will be defined 
by a pair (r, a) that is, interest rate and collateral.
We now discuss the possible credit contracts that can be offered to en­
trepreneurs and we characterise the equilibrium in the credit and labour market. 
The reader interested in the choice of institutions by the electorate in the 
first and second best world can see the figure in section 3.4 that captures the 
characterisation of the equilibrium and skip directly to section 3.5.
Separating Contract
Let us first consider the separating contracts that can be offered to the agents. 
A separating contract exists if the contract is such that agents have an incentive 
to reveal their types. Since the probability o f success is increasing in type,
6Note that he interest rate offered to entrepreneur with talent 0* is jp. Backing out the value 
of 6* from equation (3.1), we can check that
is satisfied when w >  M .
7Consider an agent with zero wealth and talent. He would be attracted to entrepreneurship 
only if  M  > w . Hence i f  this condition is not satisfied, his occupational choice condition in the 
second best world would be such that he would prefer working for a wage when R  -  m w  < 0 
and consequently there may not be a credit constraint in the economy. The existence o f  a credit 
constraint introduces interesting results. We discuss this in greater detail in section 3.S.
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agents with higher entrepreneurial ability are offered contracts with lower 
interest rates. This feature of the credit contract creates an incentive to lie for 
low ability agents. Hence for such contracts to be incentive compatible, agents 
need to have sufficient wealth that the credit market can use as a screen. The 
separating contract is defined by the incentive compatible pair (rs(d, a(6)), a(6)) 
which is the interest rate and the collateral that is offered to an agent with
talent 6. The wealth level below which a separating contract is not feasible is
determined by the constraint
R -  rsnw > 0
holding with an equality. This is shown by the following lemma.
Lem m a 3.1. No separating contract (rs,a ) can exist i f  R < rsnw
Proof In the appendix. □
The intuition for this result is the following. W hen R < rsnw, the entire 
return from the project has to be handed over to the bank when the project 
succeeds. In addition to R, agents also need to hand over a proportion of 
their wealth when the project succeeds. This additional requirement makes 
separation impossible. This happens because the separating contracts that are 
offered to high types are ones that return a large proportion y(a) o f collateral 
in the success state. However these contracts are attractive to all agents that 
choose entrepreneurship regardless of their type.
Given Lemma 3.1, we can restrict our attention to the region where 
R > rsnw. In this region, the zero profit condition for the bank is
6rs(a)nw  + (1 - 8 ) ( \  -  T)<f>a -  nw  (3.2)
when lending to an agent of type 6. Similarly, the feasibility condition for the 
loan is
R — rs(a)nw > 0.
At the point where this feasibility constraint binds, we can find the talent 
of the least talent agent that becomes an entrepreneur by plugging in the 
zero profit condition, the feasibility condition for the loan, and the agent’s 
occupational choice condition to find the lowest level o f talent and collateral 
that is consistent with a separating contract. The occupational choice constraint 
of an agent indifferent between entrepreneurship and working for a wage is
6(R -  rs(a)nw) + M  - ( 1 - t )(1  -  6)a = w.
When the feasibility constraint o f the loan binds, we have R = rs(a)nw. We 
can now back out the talent of the least talented agent who could become an
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entrepreneur. This is 9s such that
Af -  (1 -  t)(1 -  6s)a = w. (3.3)
Using equations (3.2) and (3.3) along with the feasibility condition for the 
loan, we can substitute out the equilibrium interest rate to find the expressions 
for 9S and as, the lowest level of talent and wealth that are consistent with the 
existence of a separating contract. These are
nw -  <f)(M — w) 
~R
and
is  = ------- ^ -------- - (3.4)
  (3.5)
(M  -  w)R 
(1 - t )(R - n w  + <p(M -  w))
as is a threshold wealth below which a separating contract is not feasible.
The strategy for deriving the separating contract schedule is the following. 
Equation (3.2) gives us the expression for the interest rate that is charged to 
an agent with type 0. An agent with type 6 has an incentive to declare his 
true type if a truthful declaration maximises his payoff from entrepreneurship. 
Hence if a separating contract can be designed such that a truthful declaration 
by the agent globally maximises her payoff from  entrepreneurship, then we 
can say that such a separating contract is incentive compatible.
The existence of the separating contract depends on the existence of a type 
dependent collateral schedule that is implementable. In other words, letting 
6 be the type that an agent declares in a direct mechanism, if  we can find a 
schedule of collateral a(9) such that agents find it optimal to declare their true 
types (0 = 0), then (rs(9, a{9)), a{9)) is a separating contract. It is optimal for 
an agent of type 9 with wealth a to declare her type truthfully if:
argmax ve{9) = 9 (3.6)
8
where
vg(0) = 0 (r  -  r(9, a(9))nw + (1 -  r)a(0)J -  (1 -  r)a(0) + M. (3.7)
The first order condition of this problem yields a differential equation that 
we can use to solve for the collateral schedule a(0) such that agents have an 
incentive to reveal their types truthfully. This is
a(9) =
nw  
0 d  - T )
l . JL\
_  ( R - n w )  I i s / l - g \ T
™  l l - 0 j  \  9 )
(3.8)
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The steps for the derivation of a(§) and the expression showing the concavity 
of the objective function are in the appendix.
The uniqueness o f the solution to the differential equation tells us that 
there exists a unique collateral schedule such that agents find it optimal to 
declare their types truthfully. Since the zero profit condition for the banks is 
embedded into the expression for the interest rate in the objective function 
of the agents. We can recover the interest rate by plugging in the collateral 
schedule a{6) into the interest rate rs(6, a(0)). It is possible to check that a{Q) is 
monotonically increasing in 6. High types are willing to post higher collateral 
since the value that an entrepreneur places on the reduction in the interest rate 
relative to the increase in collateral is increasing in her type. W hen the type 
of the agent is the highest possible, that is, 8 = 1, the corresponding collateral 
is a and the interest rate charged is 1.
Pooling Contract
In addition to a separating contract, there may also exist pooling contracts 
in this economy. Unlike the separating contract that is only available when 
R > rs(a)nw, a pooling contract is possible both for the region of wealth that 
satisfies the corresponding condition, and also for a certain interval of wealth 
where this constraint is violated.
Let us first consider the region o f wealth such that R > rp(a)nw. Any 
pooling contract that could be offered must satisfy the necessary condition of 
zero profit for competitive banks:
rp{a)9p(a)nw + (1 -  0p(a))( 1 -  T)<f>a = nw. (3.9)
Like we saw in the case of the separating contract, we can use the occupational 
choice constraint of the agents to evaluate the talent of the least talented agent 
that chooses entrepreneurship. This is 6 such that
6(R -  rp(a)nw) + M  -  (1 -  r ) ( l  -  6)a = w (3.10)
Now let us consider the zero profit condition for banks when R < rpnw. 
In this region, in addition to the project returns R, the banks also need to be 
pledged a proportion of collateral for them to break even. The zero profit 
contract is now defined by
dp(a)(R + (1 -  y (a))(l -  r)0a ) + (1 -  dp(a))( 1 -  r)<f>a = nw. (3.11)
where (1 -  y(a)) is the proportion of collateral that is taken over by the bank 
in case the project succeeds. It is im portant to note that entrepreneurship
is attractive not just because o f the appropriable return R but also for the
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non-appropriable return M . If  the latter is large enough, agents would be 
willing to choose entrepreneurship in exchange for their wealth even in the 
case when the project succeeds. Note that this formulation implicitly assumes 
that the optimal contract is one where all wealth is seized when the agent 
defaults. On the other hand, when the project succeeds, the minimum wealth 
a<f>{\ - r ) ( l  -  y(a)) that satisfies the zero profit condition of the bank is seized. 
It is easy to see that the pooling contract will take this form since this is the 
preferred contract for agents with high talent. Agents with high talent succeed 
with a higher probability and hence, relative to less talented agents, prefer 
contracts that are tougher in the bad state and yield a high payoff in the good 
state. Note that y(a) is increasing in a since banks would have to appropriate 
a larger share of wealth in the good state to satisfy the zero profit condition 
when the agent has lower wealth.
In both these regions, 6p(a) is the average talent in the pool at wealth level
a:
1
6 J a )  =  K   f 6f(6)d6  (3.12)
P 1 -  F(9(a,)) J  
m
and 6(a) is the agent with the lowest talent in the pool, who must be indifferent 
between working for a wage and becoming an entrepreneur with the pooling 
contract. In the region where R < rpnw  this is determined by
M  -  (1 -  r ) ( l  -  6(a)y(a))a = w. (3.13)
Plugging (3.12) in (3.11), the system of two equations (3.11) and (3.13) 
simultaneously determines the y(a ) which can be thought o f as the pooling 
interest rate and the lower bound 6(a) of types that could choose the pooling 
contract (y(a), a) if they have wealth a. However, there exists a lower bound 
of wealth below which banks are not willing to offer such a contract. Note 
that credit contracts can only be offered when
6p(a)R + (1 -  T)<f>a > nw.
This condition only holds when agents have sufficient wealth. This in turn 
defines the wealth level ap, such that agents with wealth less than this threshold 
will not be offered a pooling contract. Note that at this wealth level y(a) = 0 
must hold since agents would have to forgo their entire wealth in order to 
secure the credit contract.
Substituting this, and y(ap) = 0 into the occupational choice condition (3.13) 
of the marginal agent who is indifferent, we find at this wealth level, all agents 
choose entrepreneurship. 6(ap) = 0 and
o
This implies that at the lowest level o f wealth that is consistent with the 
pooling contract, all agents prefer to become entrepreneurs.
Lem m a 3.2. The lower bound o f  talent in a pool at any given wealth class is 
weakly increasing in wealth.
Proof. In the appendix. □
In words, starting from  ap, an agent o f a higher wealth class receives a 
lower interest rate but has a greater loss in case of failure, and this second 
effect always dominates for an agent at the bottom o f the talent distribution. 
Hence entrepreneurship is more attractive to less talented agents when they 
have less wealth, since they have less to lose in case o f default. Since these 
agents prefer working for a wage at high levels o f wealth, the quality o f the 
pool of borrowers is weakly increasing in wealth. The maximum wealth level 
for which a pooling contract can be acceptable is given by
such that the pooling interest rate drops to 1. This is the level o f collateral 
that will be charged in a pooling contract when the interest rate equals one.
In the previous section we have discussed the types o f credit contracts that 
can exist in the economy. We are now ready to characterise the equilibrium.
3.4.1 Equilibrium in the Credit Market
We have shown that both pooling and separating contracts are viable. Given 
that banks can introduce any contract (r(a), a) we w ill now characterise the 
equilibrium in the model. We will use the Rothschild Stiglitz equilibrium 
concept where an equilibrium is characterised by the conditions: i) all the 
contracts in the equilibrium set make non negative profits and ii) non existence 
of a contract that can be introduced that will make a strictly positive profit. 
We will assume that a„>  0. It is easy to check that a„ < a < d .  Hence there
—p  J —P —S
GPiap) = J o f(0 )d O .  (3.15)
3.4 Equilibrium
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is no contract that can be offered to (and accepted by) an agent with wealth 
a < ap that will make non negative profits.
L em m a 3.3. There exists a level o f  wealth ap defined by 8S = 8(ap) where 
a > ap > as such that the only contract in the equilibrium set fo r  a < a p can 
be a pooling contract.
Proof Recall that 9(a) is the level o f talent such that an agent with this 
talent is indifferent between becoming an entrepreneur with the pooling 
contract (rp(a), a) and working for a wage. Since the distribution o f wealth 
is continuous, there exists a level of wealth ap such that an agent with talent 
9s = 8(ap) is indifferent between both these alternatives and the separating 
contract ( /- (a ^ )) , a(9s)). A t as the agent with type 8S prefers the pooling 
to the separating contract since she receives a cross subsidy. A t ap the 
attractiveness of the cross subsidy disappears since the collateral requirement 
becomes too high. Hence even though a separating contract is feasible at as it 
is not incentive compatible for an agent with type 8s to accept it. It becomes 
incentive compatible only when the agent has wealth a > ap at which point 
he prefers ( r ,(<*(£,)), a(8s) to (rp(ap), ap)) □
L em m a 3.4. In the region o f  wealth a € (ap,a ) there exists a level o f  talent 
8s(a) such that agents with talent 6 > 8s(a) prefer the pooling contract and  
agents with talent 6 < 8s(a) prefer the separating contract.
Proof. Note that for a € (ap,a )  a fully separating contract schedule is not 
available since the collateral required for full separation o f types is a. 
implies that the attractiveness o f the pooling contract is increasing in type. 
This is obvious since it simply captures the fact that more wealth is better 
for screening than less. This implies the existence o f a cutoff talent 8s(a) for 
level of wealth a > ap such that it becomes possible to offer agents with talent 
9 < 8s(a) a separating contract that they prefer to the pooling contract. Note 
that 9s(ap) = 8(ap) = 8s and 9s(a) = 1  □
Proposition  3.1. [Existence and Uniqueness] A  unique credit market equilib­
rium exists such that agents with wealth a:
•  a > a :  are offered separating contracts
•  a > a > ap: are offered both pooling and separating contract
•  ap > a > ap: are offered pooling contracts
•  dp > a: are credit constrained
Proof, a < ap are credit constrained since no contract that makes non negative 
profits can be offered to these agents. Lemma 3.3 shows that only a pooling
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contract can exist in the region of wealth a < a p. Lem ma 3.4 shows that in 
the region o f wealth a > a > ap agents with talent 6 < 9s(a) a separating 
contract and 6 > 6s(a) accept a pooling contract. For the region of wealth 
a > a a fully separating schedule of contract exists that is olfered and accepted 
by agents. This is a unique equilibrium since the zero profit pooling and 
separating contract schedules are unique. □
Proposition 3.2 (Occupational Choice). Agents with wealth:
•  ap > a become workers
•  ap > a > ap and talent 9 > 6(a) accept the pooling contract and become 
entrepreneurs and the rest become workers
•  a > a > ap and talent 1 > 6 > 9s(a) accept the pooling contract and  
become entrepreneurs; and talent 6s(a)) > 6 > 6 s accept the separating 
contract and become entrepreneurs, and the rest become workers
•  a > a and talent 6 > 9s accept the separating contract and become 
entrepreneurs and the rest become workers
Proof. Follows from lemma 3.2 to lemma 3.4 and proposition 3.1. □
The following figure presents a graphical representation of the equilibrium. 
As seen in the figure, we can conveniently analyse the equilibrium in terms of 
four regions of wealth:
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium
1
Pooling ContractsCredit
Separating Contracts
9,•S
Constr.
Workers Unconstrained Workers
a
- p
a
•  Region 1: ap > a are credit constrained and become workers;
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•  Region 2: ap > a > ap and talent 8 > 6(a) accept the pooling contract 
and become entrepreneurs and the rest become workers;
•  Region 3: a > a > ap and talent 1 > 8 > 8s(a) accept the pooling 
contract and become entrepreneurs; and talent 8s(a)) > 8 > 8s accept 
the separating contract and become entrepreneurs, and the rest become 
workers;
•  Region 4: a > a and talent 8 > 8 s accept the separating contract and 
become entrepreneurs and the rest become workers.
At wealth level as it is possible to offer a separating contract to the agent 
with talent 8s. However at this wealth level the agent with talent 8S will always 
accept the pooling contract since he pledges the same level as collateral but 
receives a lower interest rate with the pooling contract because o f the cross 
subsidy. As the wealth of this agent increases, the pooling contract that is 
offered becomes less attractive since the pooling contract always requires 
an agent to pledge all his wealth as collateral. A t wealth level ap the agent 
prefers to take the separating contract with collateral as rather than take the 
pooling contract with wealth ap. Hence though separating contract is feasible 
from wealth level as, in equilibrium they are only seen from wealth level 
ap. Because of this reason, as the level of wealth rises the talent o f the least 
talented agent who accepts the pooling contract also rises. Similar to region 
2 where there is no separating contract, this happens because agents with 
higher wealth prefer to become workers due to the high collateral requirement 
for being an entrepreneur. In region 3 however, this happens due to the 
high collateral requirement o f the pooling contract relative to the separating 
contract.
In region 3 take a specific wealth level a. The agent with talent 8s(a) 
is indifferent between the separating contract that is offered to him  and the 
pooling contract and accepts the separating contract. The agents with talent 
8s(a) > 8 > 8s strictly prefer the respective separating contracts they are 
offerred. Now consider an agent with talent greater than 8s(a). I will show 
that all agents in this group prefer the pooling contract rather than accepting 
the separating contract offered to the agent with talent 8s(a). Agent with talent 
8s(a) (lets call this 8 to ease notation) who is indifferent between pooling and 
separating contract implies:
vs(8) = 8(R -  rs(as)nw) + M + 8 ( 1 -  r)as + (1 -  r)(a -  as) (3.17)
where as and rs(as) are the collateral and interest rate for the separating 
contract defined by (3.8). The value for this agent from the pooling contract is
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vp(6) = 6(R -  rp(a)nw) + M  + 6(1 -  r)a. (3.18)
Equating vs(6) = vp(6) we get
(1 ~  t )(1 —6)
rp(a)nw = rs(a )nw ------------  ^ (a -  as). (3.19)
F 6
Take a 6 > 6. I will now show that agent with talent 6 will prefer the pooling
contract to the separating contract offered to agents with talent 6. Using the
expression for the pooling interest rate in equation (3.19) we have:
vp(6) = 9 ( R -  rs(as)nw + —— — — (a -  as)\ + M  + 6( 1 -  r)a. (3.20)
On the other hand the value from  mimicking 6 and accepting the pooling 
contract is
vf(0) = 6(R -  rs(as)nw) + M + 6 ( 1 -  r)a s + (1 -  r)(a -  as). (3.21)
Equating vp(9) and ves(6) we find that the pooling contract dominates for all
6. Hence types greater than 6 prefer to post the higher collateral and get the 
pooling contract rather than take the separating contract offered to agent 6.
In the region o f wealth a < ap the talent of the least talented agent is 
6(a). However when a separating contract becomes feasible the nature of 
this function that determines the talent of the least talented agent in the pool 
changes somewhat hence we call it 6s(a). 6s(a) is defined by 2 conditions: 
The first condition determines the feasibility o f the separating contract, i.e 
equation (3.8). Since equation (3.8) is monotonically increasing in 6, it is 
invertible. Expressing equation (3.8) as a function o f theta we have: 9s(a). 
The second condition that determines 9s(a) is the condition that determines 
the indifference between the payoffs from the pooling and separating contract 
for the agent. Let us call this 6(a). Hence in region 3 we have:
6s(a) = max{0(a), 6s(a)} (3.22)
This is because it is possible for either o f the two constraints to be slack in 
this region. It is possible that agents prefer the separating contract but the 
separating contract is simply not feasible in which case 9s(a) would bind. 
Alternatively it is possible that the separating contract is feasible but agents at 
the lower end prefer the pooling contract. In this case 6(a) would bind.
Now consider the threshold at which region 3 begins. If  6s(a) binds
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here then we have ap = as. However this is not possible for the following 
reason. If  8s(a) binds at the threshold this implies that 8(as) < 8s(a_s). This 
implies that even though the agent with talent 8S is made to post the same 
level of collateral and receives a lower interest rate with the pooling contract, 
he still prefers the separating contract. This is not possible. Hence at the 
beginning of region 3 8(a) binds and we have ap > as. Note that as 8(a) 
follows continuously from from region 2, the transition from  region 2 to 3 
from 8(a) to 8s(a) is continuous. Thereafter 8s(a) is continuous since both 
8(a) and 8s(a) are continuous. Note that it is possible that there could be finite 
points where 8(a) and 6s(a) cross each other making 8s(a) non differentiable. 
However this does not affect the monotonicity property of 8s(a) since both 
8(a) and 8s(a) are monotonically increasing in a.
3.4.2 Equilibrium in the Labour Market
The labour market is perfectly competitive. An equilibrium is characterised by 
the demand equalling supply. It is much easier to characterise the equilibrium 
by thinking of the labour demand of a firm instead o f the labour demand by 
an entrepreneur. A firm demands 1 unit of entrepreneurial and n units o f non 
entrepreneurial labour. Supply is 0 for wage w < w , and 1 at w = w. Labour 
demand is given by:
Ld = (n + 1) f * ' ( l - F ( « ( a ) ) )
\  —p
g(a)da + (1 -  F (0S))(1 -  G(dp)) (3.23)
Proposition 3.3. The equilibrium wage is w when Ld(w) < 1 w > w when 
Ld(w) > 1
Proof. Note that Labour demand is monotonically decreasing in the wage: 
dLd
dw = (n+1)
da
. )-=± 
~pj dw - f  m a ) ) ^ - g ( a ) d a < 0  
(3.24)
smce
da dd,
—^ > 0  ^  > 0
dw dw
d8(a)
dw
> 0 (3.25)
If  Labour demand is less than 1, there is excess supply o f labour in the 
economy and the wage must equal w  which is the outside option to working 
for a wage. If the labour demanded at w = w  is more that 1, then the economy 
is tight in the sense that no one is engaged in the subsistence sector, and the 
wage must increase to equilibriate demand and supply.
□
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The proof shows that there are two effects that create a labour demand 
that is monotonically decreasing in wage.
Firstly as the wage increases, the amount that entrepreneurs need to borrow 
also increases. This drives up the credit constraint.
Secondly, as wage increases, the agent with the lowest talent that was 
previously indifferent between entrepreneurship and paid employment now 
prefers paid employment. This is because the increase in wage tips his 
occupational choice constraint. Both these effect imply a reduction in labour 
demand for an increase in wage.
Note that in this economy M  > w is necessary and sufficient for there to 
be a credit constraint If the equilibrium wage rises above this then the bank’s 
zero profit condition is satisfied even at 0 wealth. We will assume that the 
equilibrium wage is lower than M  since the problem without credit constraint 
is not interesting to analyse.8
3.5 Credit Market Institutions
The argument we make is that when interest groups are created in an imperfect 
market, then this can lead to an inefficient choice of institutional reform. In the 
first best world where talent is observable, the best institutions are chosen. As 
we move away from the first best world, there is not only a market inefficiency 
created by the unobservability of talent, but also a political inefficiency through 
the creation of class structure in the electorate that votes in favour of inefficient 
institutions.
The parameter r  captures the strength of enforcement o f property rights. A 
high t  implies that law enforcement is poor and assets are likely to be stolen 
by thieves or taken over by the local strongman. Hence a straightforward way 
to think about r  is how tough government is on property related crim e and 
how well it enforces the claims of someone dispossessed of their property. 
Alternatively, r  can also be thought of as how well the titling system works. To 
the extent it is easy to bribe the local bureaucrat to get the name on someone’s 
land title changed, r  would be high and vice versa.
The parameter 0  measures the efficiency o f contractual institutions. The 
treatment of 0  is somewhat different since it is the proportion of collateralized 
wealth that can be liquidated. If  an agent pledges wealth a as collateral to 
become an entrepreneur, and his project fails, the bank only recovers 0a. Hence 
(1 -<p)a is pure inefficiency and consequently there is a strong case for thinking 
that 0 = 1  will be the surplus maximising policy. However under certain
8It should be noted that in contrast to Ghatak et al. (2007) there are no multiple equilibria 
since firm level labour demand is constant at n . This implies that in our model the what drives 
the labour demand is the extensive margin effect
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conditions, this effect may be dominated through the inefficiencies caused in 
the occupational choices since a high <p can end up making entrepreneurship 
attractive to agents who should optimally become workers.
<p and r  are parameters that capture institutional frictions that reduce the 
efficiency o f market transactions involving wealth.9 This can be illustrated 
with the following example. To fix ideas let us think o f wealth as land. 
Consider a scenario where there’s an agent who wishes to rent out his land. 
This landlord would consider two things when entering into a rental contract 
w ith a potential tenant. Firstly he would consider how secure his property 
rights are. W hen r  is high, the landlord realises that his property rights over 
the land he is renting out are not very secure. This dampens the incentives for 
renting the land since the landlord worries about a potential capture by the 
tenant. Independently, a low <p implies that enforcement o f contracts is costly. 
The landlord anticipates that in the event a tenant refuses to vacate the land 
as per the terms of the rental contract, the landlord would need to approach 
the courts for enforcement o f his contractual rights. Even if property rights 
are fully secure, if <p is low, the court costs would be substantial. Therefore a 
low <f> would also dampen the incentives to put land to its productive use.
The distinction between the two institutions is heuristic.10 In most appli­
cations one can think of, <j> and r  would interact together creating aggregate 
transaction costs that would dampen the incentives for market transactions 
involving wealth. For example in the model presented here, both enter multi- 
plicatively when agents post their wealth as collateral to become entrepreneurs. 
The credit market takes into account both the insecurity o f the property right 
over the collateral and the costs o f enforcing the credit contract in case of 
default.
3.5.1 Institutions in the First Best World
We now show that in the first best world the surplus maximising institutions 
are chosen.
Proposition  3.4. When talent is observable, voters unanimously choose surplus 
maximising institutions.
9We have focused only on institutional frictions involving wealth because wealth is the 
instrument that banks can use to mitigate the inefficiencies due to the unobservability o f talent, 
and w e want to show that the political process can fail to choose the right reforms even when 
there is no redistributive objective.
10In Besley (1995) three channels through which property rights affects investment incentives 
are laid out. These are the security o f tenure, the use o f property as collateral, and the benefits o f 
gains from trade. O f these we feel that the first and the third are channels through which r  would 
affect investment incentives whereas the second channel relating to the use o f land as collateral is 
affected by an interaction o f r  and <j> as is the case in the model. O f course wealth in our model 
is exogenous and therefore the issue o f  investment incentives does not arise.
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Proof. Total surplus in the economy is maximized when the m ost talented 
agents become entrepreneurs regardless of their wealth. This is equivalent to 
the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs being maximised. Under the first best 
the total surplus in the economy is:
By inspecting this expression it is clear that the total surplus is decreasing 
in r . Hence r  = 0 is the surplus maximising. Since all agents lose a part 
of their wealth as r  increases, agents unanimously vote for r  equal to zero. 
Since <f> does not appear in (3.26), all values of 0 are surplus maximising, and
When talent is observable, the preferences of the electorate are unanimously 
aligned with surplus maximisation. Hence a t  = 0 is chosen because better 
property rights increase the expected payoff o f all agents. Similarly the 
optimal <f> would be chosen to the extent there are any contractual transactions 
involving wealth. Note that in the first best in our model there are no contractual 
transactions involving wealth since talent is observable and wealth has no use 
as a screen. Hence all values o f <f> are optimal in the first best world.
3.5.2 Institutions in the Second Best World
In the last subsection we showed that in the first best world the preferences of 
the electorate are unanimously aligned with surplus maximisation. We will 
show that as soon as there’s a departure from  the first best, the inefficiency 
of the market gets further amplified by the choices of the electorate that is 
created in the inefficient market. In the second best world with unobservable 
talent, the total surplus is:
00
f  e m d e J 'c  1 -  r)ag(a)d(a) (3.26)
hence the proposition is trivially true for <f>. □
I I  9f(0)g(a)d6da + I I  6f(6)g(a)d6da( “p l 00 1 (3.27)
f ( l -  F (ka)))g(a)da  + (1 -  G(3P))(1 -  f  (9,))
7
+vy 1 -  (» + 1) J ( 1  -  F(6(a)))g(a)da + (1 -  F(B$))( 1 -  G{ap)) + J ( l - T)ag(a)da
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00 1
J '  J  ( 6 ( 1 -  y(a )) + (1 -  6)) af(6)g(a)d6da + a( 1 -  6)f(6)g(a)d6da
kQ.p 0(a)
In this economy there are two productive activities, the subsistence sector 
where a worker produces vv, and the hi tech sector where n  workers and 1 
entrepreneur of ability 6 produce R  with probability 9 and 0 with probability 
(1 -0 ) . The project also yields a non expropriable return M  to the entrepreneur. 
The wage paid to the worker in the hi tech sector is simply a transfer from  
the entrepreneur to the worker which doesn’t enter the total surplus. In the 
world with full information, the first best is guaranteed, where all agents are 
engaged in the hi tech sector either as a worker or entrepreneurs. This is what 
equation (3.26) captures.
In the second best world it is possible that there are agents that work in 
the subsistence sector. The mass o f agents engaged in the hi tech sector is 
n + 1 times the mass of entrepreneurs. The rest o f the agents work in the 
subsistence sector where they produce vv. This is captured in the third part of 
equation (3.27) which takes a positive value when w = vv and 0 otherwise.
The fourth part o f the expression captures the loss o f wealth when r  
is greater than 0. Similarly when <j> is less than one there is some loss of 
collateral in case o f default. The first best could be achieved if  ap = 0 and 
6(a) = 6s = 6*. In such a case none of the agents in the economy are engaged 
in the subsistence sector and hence the second term in the expression drops 
out.
It is easy to see why the first best is never possible when talent is unob­
servable. Even when there is no credit constraint, at low enough levels o f 
wealth, separation is not possible. A t the bottom of the wealth distribution 
where a = 0, the credit market can only offer a pooling contract. W ith a 
pooling contract at a = 0, the talent of the least talented agent that chooses 
entrepreneurship is always lower than 6* since 6* is the talent o f the least 
talented agent that accepts her actuarially fair contract in the full information 
case. Since the least talented agent receives a cross subsidy with the pooling 
contract but not a separating contract, the talent o f the marginal agent with 
0 wealth is lower when talent is unobservable. But since the mass of en­
trepreneurs is bounded at and at the lower end of the wealth distribution 
agents w ith talent less than 6* are entrepreneurs, then at wealth a > ap, 9s 
must be greater than 6*. That is, agents that would become entrepreneurs in 
the first best world, choose to work for a wage. This drives the inefficiency in 
the model. If credit constraint exists then there is the added inefficiency of 
agents with high talent but low wealth that are excluded from entrepreneurship.
The first best can only be replicated in the world with incomplete informa­
tion if all agents have sufficient wealth and can be offered a separating contract.
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Therefore if  the average wealth in this economy is greater than the threshold 
level o f wealth required for separation, a policy of redistribution can restore 
full efficiency in this economy. If the total level of wealth is insufficient or if 
the instruments for conducting such a redistribution are unavailable then there 
will always be some inefficiency since there would at the same time be agents 
with talent less than 6* who choose entrepreneurship and talent greater than 
6* that choose working for a wage.
O bservation 3.1. A non-zero level o f  credit constraint may be optimal in this 
economy.
Given this discussion, it is possible to envisage distributions of wealth and 
talent such that there exists a non zero “natural level o f credit constraint”. That 
is, the total surplus may not always be maximised when the credit constraint 
is pushed down. Though reducing the credit constraint allows agents with low 
wealth to become entrepreneurs, this has an effect through the labour market 
of increasing the wage. Increasing the wage may in turn reduce the number 
of high type entrepreneurs with high wealth.
To discuss whether endogenous institutions can bring the economy in the 
direction of higher welfare or not, suppose that all agents can vote in a binary 
election between a status quo institution (status quo 0  or t )  and an alternative. 
When faced with a binary choice, each agent votes sincerely.
One obvious remark we will make, without making distributional assump­
tions, is that an alternative policy that is aimed at maximising total surplus 
may not win when put to majority vote. This result in itself is not particularly 
surprising. Since redistributive instruments are lacking it is to be expected 
that agents inefficiently use institutions to redistribute rather than to maximise 
surplus. Indeed such a choice of institutions is not inefficient in the paretian 
sense. What is interesting here however is that the alignment of interest groups 
is itself created by the existence of market failure and this alignment takes the 
economy away even from the second best world with market failures. In other 
words, the inefficiency of market failure is further amplified by the political 
alignments it creates.
The cornerstone to understanding why agents choose non surplus max­
imising institutions is the following: in this economy there are always at least
workers. Since n > 1, a policy that increases wage has support of at least 
half the population. However policies that increase the wage may not increase 
the quality o f the pool o f entrepreneurs. This is the insight that we will use 
to generate the results in the rest of this section. Thus efficient institutions are 
those that increase the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs whereas institutions 
that increase wage are politically feasible.
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Support for improvement in judicial enforcement
The parameter <p in the model denotes the amount of collateral that banks can 
liquidate in case of default and is the parameter that denotes the quality of 
the judiciary. Instead of a cost that is proportional to the collateral in dispute, 
the quality o f the judiciary could be modelled as a fixed cost that need to 
be paid for approaching the judiciary. In such a model (f> would be a fixed 
cost and interest rate would instead be determined by the following zero profit 
condition:
r(a)nw6 + ((1 -  r )a  -  <f){\ - 6 )  = nw  (3.28)
The idea we wish to capture with 0 is the efficiency o f the judiciary in 
expropriating assets o f a defaultor and handing them over to the creditor at the 
least possible cost. This idea is captured in both these formulations. Given 
the discussion on efficiency and political feasibility, we have:
Proposition 3.5. A policy aim ed a t increasing <p is guaranteed majority 
support but may not always be surplus maximising.
Proof. There are two parts to this proposition. The first part is that a policy 
of increasing <(> is guaranteed majority support. This is proven in the appendix. 
The second part is that such a policy is not guaranteed to be surplus maximising. 
This is proven by construction of an example in the final extension where 
increasing <p reduces total surplus. □
The intuition for the result is the following. It is easy to show that the 
equilibrium wage is non decreasing in <p, and hence the proposal for increasing 
<p is supported by the majority. However, total surplus may not be increasing in 
<f> since the effect of an increase in 0  on the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs 
is ambiguous.
This result is quite striking when contrasted against the standard intuition 
about contracting institutions. Here improving the quality o f contracting 
institutions (increasing <p) is not always good since that makes entrepreneurship 
more attractive and this induces low types to become entrepreneurs. This result 
arises because there are inherent externalities when agents borrow money: the 
low type entrepreneurs by their very existence impose an externality on the 
high types. Our result can be easily understood when seen in the light of the 
theory of second best.
Support for Improvement in Property Rights
Imperfect protection of property rights reduces the value o f wealth. This in 
turn makes entrepreneurship more attractive since agents do not place as much 
weight on default and consequent loss o f collateral.
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The political support for a change in t  is ambiguous because the effect on 
the wage is ambiguous. We can see this from the following:
dLd 9a gg f  .  g g ia \
- ^  :(»+!) I /(m )-^g (a )da
/
(3.29)
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. This is because:
d*p
(3.30)
d r  d r
dap _  n w -  0p(ap)R dOp(ap)
8 t  0(1 -  r ) 2 d r
  > 0
0(1 - t )J
(3.31)
since
(3.32)
The credit constraint is increasing in r .  W hen r  increases, the effective 
wealth of an agent decreases, and the interest rate at all levels o f wealth 
increases. This is intuitive since an increase in t  decreases the value of wealth 
as a screen. Since agents are likely to have their wealth expropriated anyway, 
posting a high collateral is less effective in revealing an agent’s type. Take the 
limiting case where r  goes close to 1, in this case, the credit market correctly 
anticipates that all agents are equally eager to post any collateral since they 
know that their wealth will be expropriated and hence don’t attach any value 
on recovery of collateral in the event of success and consequent repayment of 
the loan.
There are two opposing effects on wage o f a decrease in t .  Firstly de­
creasing t  reduces the level of credit constraint. This increases the number of 
entrepreneurs. Decreasing r  also decreases the attractiveness of entrepreneur­
ship for marginal agents (0(a)), who were previously accepting the pooling 
contract to become entrepreneurs due to the cross subsidy from higher types 
within their wealth level. Since there are two opposite effects on wage, the pre­
cise effect on total surplus of a change in r  would depend on the assumptions 
on the distribution o f wealth and talent. However in case these two effects 
exactly cancel each other out, it is possible then to characterise the effect on 
total surplus.
P roposition  3.6. I f  the wage remains unchanged as a result o f  a change in t ,  
then decreasing (increasing) t  increases (decreases) total surplus
Proof. If  wage remains unchanged as a result of a decrease in r  then the new 
equilibrium pareto dominates the previous equilibrium. All agents who remain
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workers are unaffected, all entrepreneurs are made better off due to a reduction 
in the interest rate. Additionally there are agents who were previously credit 
constrained who can now become entrepreneurs for whom the policy is a strict 
improvement over status quo. Since it is a pareto improvement, it must also 
increase total surplus. Similarly if an increase in t  keeps the wage unchanged, 
it must reduce the total surplus since workers are unaffected, entrepreneurs are 
made worse off due to the increase in the interest rate, and there are at least 
some agents who are denied credit as a result o f the increase in the credit 
constraint who are made strictly worse off. □
By continuity we can extend this proposition to mean that if the change in 
wage as a result of an improvement in property rights is small enough, then 
total surplus must have increased. It is possible to push this result further.
Proposition 3.7. I f  the change in wage as a result o f improvement (deteriora­
tion) in property right is negative (positive) then total surplus must increase 
(decrease).
Proof. Note first that the average quality o f the pool o f entrepreneurs is a 
sufficient statistic for gauging changes in total surplus. If  the wage decreases 
as a result o f an decrease in r ,  it m ust be the case that the effect on labour 
demand through 0(a) dominates the reduction in the credit constraint. Now 
note that the average talent at the lowest level o f wealth where a pooling 
contract is offered is lower than the average talent of the pool. This is true 
because the distribution of wealth and talent are independent and the talent of 
the least talented agent within a wealth level is increasing in wealth.
Now note that is always possible to construct a distribution of wealth 
such that the pre reform average talent is the same but post reform the credit 
constraint is relaxed more to the extent that the two opposing effects on wage 
cancel each other out and wage remains unchanged. In this case, the average 
talent post reform would be lower than the case where the wage went down. 
However, given the previous result, the total surplus would still increase. 
Since the initial average quality o f the pool o f entrepreneurs is the same by 
construction, this implies that the ex post level of talent must have increased 
in the case where the wage decreases. □
This result brings into sharp relief the trade-off between political feasibility 
and efficiency of institutional reform. Only reforms that increase wages are 
politically feasible but these may not correspond to reforms that are surplus 
maximising. In case of property rights institutions, when worsening them 
(increasing t )  is politically feasible, they have an unambiguously negative 
effect on the total surplus. The political feasibility o f r  depends on the 
distribution of wealth, if the median voter is a worker with very low wealth
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she would care more about the effect on wage and would therefore vote in 
favour o f worsening property rights.
3.6 Conclusion
To summarise our result on institutional efficiency and feasibility, we find that 
improving contractual institutions is always feasible but may not always be 
efficient since improving contracting induces too many low type agents to 
choose entrepreneurship. On the other hand we find that if  worsening property 
rights institutions is politically feasible then it unambiguously reduces total 
surplus. Similarly if improving property rights is politically infeasible then it 
unambiguously increases total surplus. These results bring into sharp focus 
the tension between political feasibility and surplus maximisation.
W hen there’s a market failure, the competitive equilibrium is no longer 
guaranteed to be on the Pareto frontier. Our model makes the point that in the 
event o f a market failure, competitive markets can passively play a political 
role o f creating constituencies. These constituencies can have a preference 
for inefficient policies. This leads to the inefficiencies of market failure being 
further amplified by the policy choices that constituencies created in a flawed 
market make. In this sense this chapter provides an additional reason to worry 
about market failure; market failure may lead to a political failure even in a 
fully representative democracy.
Appendix
P roo f for Lem m a 3.1
Proof. I f  R < rsnw then there are insufficient appropriable returns to cover 
the interest payments from the loan. Hence the only way the banks can break 
even is if  entrepreneurs pledge a portion o f their collateral even in the state 
where the project is successful. Let us call the proportion of collateral that 
banks seize in the good state (1 -  y(a)). The new zero profit condition for 
banks when they lend to an agent whose declared type is 8 is
6(R + (1 -  y (a))(l -  r)<pa) + (1 -  8)( 1 -  T)<f>a = nw
Rearranging this, we get
8R -  nw  + (1 -  r )0 a
y(a) = -------=--------------------. (3.33)
8(1 -r)(pa
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The left hand side of the occupational choice constraint for an agent with 
talent 0 who accepts a separating contract (designed for an agent with talent 
0) is
M  -  (1 -  0y(a))(l -  i ) a  
Substituting the value for y ( a )  from equation (3.33) we get:
~ (9R  -  nw + (1 -  r ) (p a \
ve(9) = M  + 6 1------------ =---------------1 -  (1 -  T )a.
We can now differentiate this equation with respect to the declaration 6 to see 
whether the agent has an incentive to declare his type truthfully. It is easy 
to check that in the relevant range, the payoff of the agent vg(9) is increasing 
in his declaration 6. Hence agents will always overstate their type and a 
separating contract cannot exist. □
D erivation o f a(6) from  section 3.3.2.
An agent o f type 9 maximises his payoff from entrepreneurship by choosing 
the declaration that maximises vg(9).
argmax vg(9) = 9. (3.34)
9
The first order condition for this problem evaluated at 9 = 9 is: 
nw a(9)4>
0 ( l - 0 ) ( l - r ) ( l - 0 )  0 ( 1 - 0 X 1 - 0 )
-  a'(9) = 0. (3.35)
L *  W -9)(T-m-<p) be Q{6) and be P{d)- ^  is a differential equation
of the following form:
a'(9) + P(9)a(9) = Q 0 )  
which is characterised by the solution
eS m s a{9) = J  e f m S Q(9)d9 + C 
Solving this for a(9) we find that:
/ / - v  \
^ t "V ' ' /
✓ Sv nWa(9) =
0 d - r )
where C  is the constant o f integration. Since lower bound values of 0 = 9s 
and a(9) = a  we can solve for the particular solution. This is
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a(6) =
J - \
nw
0(1 - t )
It is possible to check that the second order condition is satisfied. The second 
order condition for this problem is:
(nw -  0(1 -  r)a(9)) -  T)a'(S) -  a"(0 )(l -  r ) ( l  -  0)(1 -  0) < 0
By inspection it is possible to check that this equation always holds, and hence 
the function is globally concave.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof Let us first consider the region where R > rp(a)nw is satisfied. In this 
region 6(a). Totally differentiating this equation, and rearranging we find
da  
Note that
d^  _  r(a)nw  + (1 -  r)a -  j  = ( 1_T) + ^ ~  •
(3.36)
Hence
R -  r(a)nw > 0, < 0, 6(a) < 6p(a). (3.37)
de
d6(a) n
> 0. (3.38)
da
□
Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof For proving political support it is sufficient to show that wage is non 
decreasing in 0.
da 86  ^ r  .  86(a)
80 (1 ~ ^  ~ _ G(2',)) " J m ^-^SW a
(3.39)
> 0
This can be demonstrated by showing that
da 86T 86(a)
^ <0’ ^ <0’ and ^ <0- (3-4°>
8ap ^  nw -  6p(ap)R 86p(ap) R
8<f> 02(1 - r )  <90 (1 - t ) 0
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since
Also
dO pia )
p = 0. (3.42)
And lastly,
d(p
38s M  - w  
d0 ~ R ~
36(a)
< 0. (3.43)
< 0 (3.44)
<90
by inspection.
This implies that the equilibrium wage is non decreasing in 0. This ensures 
that the policy enjoys majority support. The inequalities are strict when vv > vv. 
If  there is a subsistence sector, then there is no effect o f 0  on the labour 
demand. The effect o f increasing 0  on total surplus is ambiguous. □
We now construct an example where the credit constraint effect dominates, 
that is, the surplus maximising 0  in the economy is less than one. Assume that 
the distribution of wealth is discrete. There are three classes in the population: 
the rich, the middle, and the poor of size p r, p m,Pp w ith wealth ar,a m,a p 
respectively. Assume:
q (P r  + P m ) <  1n + 1
It turns out that if  there is a subsistence sector in the economy then it is 
always surplus enhancing to locally increase 0. Hence to make the problem 
interesting assume that there is no subsistence sector in the economy. The 
two feasible values for 0  will be {0,1}. In this economy the credit constraint 
will be higher with 0 = 1 .
The change in total surplus as a result of increasing 0  to 1 is:
A T S  = T S ( 0 ) - r S (  1) = qpm( \-0 ) R - ( \ - 0 ) ( \ - q ) ( \ -< ft( p mamAm(® + prarAr(® )
(3.45)
The first term in the expression represents the increase in the total surplus 
due to replacement o f some low type entrepreneurs by high types as a result 
of access to credit due to reduction in the credit constraint. The second term 
represents the reduction in the surplus due to destruction of a proportion 
of assets in case of default due to imperfect judiciary. In the second term  
T(0) is the proportion of low type entrepreneurs with wealth i that choose 
entrepreneurship in equilibrium.
L em m a 3.5. I f  credit constraint worsens as a result o f  an increase in <f> from  
0  to 1, then Tm(0) = 1
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Proof. Assume this is not true. Then there are two possibilities: either 
Am(<f>) = 0 or 0 < Am( f )  < 1. Consider Am((p) = 0. This imphes that Ar(<p) = 0 
since < 0. This implies that all entrepreneurs are high types. This 
contradicts Assumption 1. If  0 < Am(<f>) < 1 then the interest rate for agents 
with wealth am is:
6R + M  — w(<f>) -  (1 -  6)am 
rs(am, (0) = ------
nw(<f>)6
Substituting this into the equation that determines the credit constraint:
R -  rs(am, $)nw(<p) > 0
it is easy to check that the credit constrain is decreasing in equilibrium 
wage. Since the equilibrium wage is monotonically increasing in 0 and hence 
the credit constraint with 0 = 1  must be lower than the credit constraint with 
0  but this is a contradiction. □
Hence the change in total surplus simplifies to:
AT S  = qpm(l -  6)R -  (1 -  0)(1 -  q)( 1 -  0 )(pmflm + p rM r(0)) (3.46)
Now we can back out Ar(<f>) since we know that the proportion of en­
trepreneurs in the economy is
'W )  = ( r T i i - - - - « ) r L --  \ ( n + l ) p r p r J l - q
Substituting this into the expression for the change in total surplus, we 
find that A T S  > 0 if:
« > — ^ ( ( l - g H . + ( , ■ * - l - g — U )  (3.47)
q \  \ ( n + l ) p m p mJ I
This equation ensures that if the credit constraint worsens as a result o f 
an increase in 0, the loss of efficiency through reduction in the quality of the 
pool o f entrepreneurs dominates the loss of collateral during recovery with a 
lower 0. The credit constraint worsens if:
R -  nw(0)rp(am,0 ) > 0 > R -  nw (l)rp(am, 1)
Solving the model to derive the equilibrium wage rate, and interest rate at 
wealth level am for both values of 0  we find:
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n 6(6R + M) + {n + \)p rq{\ -  0)(0R + M - a r) 
(n +  1)(0 + (1 - B ) p rq)
- ( 1  -0 ) (1  -  q)am >
(.q + ( l - q ) 6 ) R >
8{6R + M  -  (1 -  0 K )(1  -  p m{n + 1)) + p rqin  + 1)((1 -  0)(0* + Af) -  (1 -  0(1 -  4))ar)
P roposition  3.8. For any constellation o f  parameter values fo r  which equations
(3.48) and  (3.47) are satisfied, 0 = 1  is suboptimal.
P roof Equation (3.48) implies that the credit constraint worsens as a result 
o f an increase in <f> from <f> to 1. This implies that there are fewer high type 
entrepreneurs with 0  = 1. Equation (3.47) ensures that assuming the credit 
constraint worsens, the change in total surplus is negative for an increase in 0 
from 0  to 1. Taken together they imply that the credit constraint worsens, and 
enough high type entrepreneurs are credit constrained such that total surplus 
is diminished. □
n
(n + 1)(0(1 -  p m(n + 1)) + (1 -  6)qpr)
(3.48)
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